Federalism's values and the value of federalism

CESifo Economic Studies

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 522-560

  Inman, Robert P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; DECENTRALIZATION; DEMOCRACY; FEDERAL SYSTEM; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; PROPERTY RIGHTS;

EID: 39449102526     PISSN: 1610241X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifm018     Document Type: Conference Paper

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