Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 675-696

  Song, Fei ^a  

^a RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Behavioral game theory; Decision making; Experiment; Group representative; Individual group discontinuity; Reciprocity; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149137257     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.002     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Andreoni J. Cooperation in public goods experiment: Kindness or confusion?. Amer. Econ. Rev. 85 (1995) 891-904
2. Ashraf N., Bohnet I., and Piankov N. Decomposing trust and trustworthiness. Exper. Econ. 9 (2006) 193-208
3. Berg J., Dickhaut J., and McCabe K. Trust, trustworthiness, and social history. Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 122-142
4. Bornstein G., and Yaniv I. Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more "rational" players?. Exper. Econ. 1 (1998) 101-108
5. Brandts J., and Charness G. Hot and cold decisions and reciprocity in experiments with sequential games. Exper. Econ. 2 (2000) 227-238
6. Brewer M.B., and Brown R.J. Intergroup relations. The Handbook of Social Psychology (1998), McGraw-Hill, New York
7. Cai H. Bargaining on behalf of a constituency. J. Econ. Theory 92 (2000) 234-273
8. Camerer C.F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction (2003), Princeton Univ. Press
9. Cason T.N., and Mui V. A laboratory study of group polarization in the team dictator game. Econ. J. 107 (1997) 1465-1483
10. Cason T.N., and Mui V. Social influence in the sequential dictator game. J. Math. Psych. 42 (1998) 248-265
11. Charness G. Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 42 (2000) 375-384
12. Charness, G., Jackson, M., in press. The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking. Amer. Econ. Rev
13. Charness, G., Rigotti, L., Rustichini, A., in press. Individual behavior and group membership. J. Econ. Theory
14. Cooper D., and Kagel J. Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95 (2005) 477-509
15. Cox J. How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 260-281
16. Croson R.T.A. Information in ultimatum games: An experimental study. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 30 (1996) 197-213
17. Diekmann K.A., Tenbrunsel A., and Galinsky A.D. From self-prediction to self-defeat: Behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 85 (2003) 672-683
18. Dufwenberg M., and Gneezy U. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games Econ. Behav. 30 (2000) 163-182
19. Epley N., and Dunning D. Feeling "holier than thou": Are self-serving assessments produced by errors in self- or social prediction?. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 79 (2000) 861-875
20. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Rosenbladt, B., Schupp, J., Wagner, G., 2003. A nation-wide laboratory-Examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating experiments in representative surveys. Working paper No. 141. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
21. Fershtman C., Judd K.L., and Kalai E. Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation. Int. Econ. Rev. 32 (1991) 551-559
22. Fershtman C., and Kalai E. Unobserved delegation. Int. Econ. Rev. 38 (1997) 763-774
23. Glaeser E., Laibson D., Scheinkman J., and Soutter C. Measuring trust. Quart. J. Econ. 115 (2000) 811-846
24. Insko C.A., Pinkley R.L., Hoyle R.H., Dalton B., Hong G., Slim R., Landry P., Holton B., Ruffin P.F., and Thibaut J. Individual-group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact. J. Exper. Soc. Psych. 23 (1987) 250-267
25. Kahneman D., Knetsch J.L., and Thaler R. Fairness and the assumptions of economics. J. Bus. 4 (1986) 285-300
26. Kocher M., and Sutter M. The decision maker matters: Individual versus group behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. Econ. J. 115 (2005) 200-223
27. Kramer R. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Ann. Rev. Psych. 50 (1999) 569-598
28. Miller D.T., and Ratner R.K. The disparity between the actual and assumed power of self-interest. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 74 (1998) 53-62
29. Pillutla M.M., Malhotra D., and Murnighan J.K. Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity. J. Exper. Soc. Psych. 39 (2003) 448-455
30. Rousseau D., Sitkin S., Burt R., and Camerer C. Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy Manage. Rev. 23 (1998) 393-404
31. Schelling T.C. The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA
32. Schotter A., Zheng W., and Snyder B. Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment. Games Econ. Behav. 30 (2000) 248-292
33. Selten R. Die strategie methode zur erforschung des eigeschrankt rationalen verhaltens im rahmen eines oligopolexperiments. In: Sauermann H. (Ed). Beitrage zur Experimentellen wirt Schaftsforschung (1967), J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen 136-168
34. Snijders C., and Keren G. Determinants of trust. In: Budescu D.V., Erev I., and Zweig R. (Eds). Games and Human Behavior (1999), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ 355-385
35. Song, F., 2007. The effect of the consensus-making mechanism on intergroup trust and reciprocity in strategic interactions. Working paper
36. Song F., Cadsby B., and Morris T. Other-regarding behavior and behavioral forecasts: Female versus males as individuals and as group-representatives. Int. J. Conflict Manage. 15 (2004) 340-363
37. Tajfel H., and Turner J.C. The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: Worchel S., and Austin W.G. (Eds). Psychology of Intergroup Relations (1986), Nelson-Hall, Chicago, IL 7-24
38. Thompon L., and Hastie R. Social perception in negotiation. Organ. Behav. Human Dec. Process. 47 (1990) 98-123