The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 65, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 667-681

  Swank, Otto ^a   Visser, Bauke ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Delegation; Free riding; Herding; Information collection; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149094605     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.11.003     Document Type: Article

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