Optimal state-contingent unemployment insurance

Economics Letters

Volumn 98, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 348-357

  Sánchez, Juan M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Business cycles; Moral hazard; Recursive contracts; Unemployment insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 39049089614     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.05.015     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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