Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 189, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 269-291

  Motchenkova, Evgenia ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Antitrust law; Antitrust policy; Dynamic games; Game theory; OR in government

Indexed keywords

COST ACCOUNTING; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MARKOV PROCESSES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

DYNAMIC GAMES; MARKOVIAN STRATEGIES; SOCIAL COSTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 38949194516     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.05.048     Document Type: Article

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