Modest deontologism in epistemology

Synthese

Volumn 161, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 339-355

  Feldman, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief control; Epistemic deontologism; Epistemic evaluation; Justification

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949193189     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9088-y     Document Type: Article

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