Neurobiology, neuroimaging, and free will

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 68-82

  Glannon, Walter ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38949133737     PISSN: 03636550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00106.x     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. See, for example, G. K. Aguirre, "Functional Neuroimaging," in Todd Feinberg and Martha Farah, eds., Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychology, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003): 363-73,
2. and Martha Farah and Paul Root Wolpe, "Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications," Hastings Center Report 34 (May-June 2004): 35-45.
3. The most prominent defenders of libertarian incompatibilism have been Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),
4. and Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
5. The most prominent defenders of compatibilism have been Harry Frankfurt, "Responsibility and Alternate Possibilities," and "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," both in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 1-10, 11-25,
6. John Martin Fisher, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994),
7. and Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8. Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003).
9. This work follows Dennett's earlier defense of compatibilism in Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).
10. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II, Book III, X Barnes, trans. and ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
11. H. L. A. Hart proposes a similar default position in Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
12. Patricia Smith Churchland discusses the concept of free will as a capacity falling along a spectrum of control in "Feeling Reasons," in Antonio Damasio et al., eds., The Neurobiology of Decision-Making (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1996): 181-99,
13. and in Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), chapter 5.
14. Adrian Raine et al., "Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder," Archives of General Psychiatry 57 (2002): 119-27.
15. Richard Davidson et al., "Dysfunction in the Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation-A Possible Prelude to Violence," Science 289 (2000): 591-94.
16. A. Damasio, H. Damasio, S. Anderson et al., "Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex," Nature Neuroscience 2 (1999): 1032-37.
17. See also R. J. Dolan, "On the Neurology of Morals," Nature Neuroscience 2 (1999): 927-29,
18. Joshua Greene et al., "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment," Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400,
19. and Ekhonen Goldberg, The Executive Brain: Frontal Lobes and the Civilized Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
20. R. J. R. Blair and L. Cipolotti, "Impaired Social Response Reversal: A Case of 'Acquired Sociopathy'," Brain 123 (2002): 1122-41,
21. Blair, "Neurobiological Basis of Psychopathy," British Journal of Psychiatry 182 (2003): 5-7,
22. and K. A. Kiel et al., "Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging," Biological Psychiatry 50 (2001): 677-84.
23. These disorders fall within a larger general framework of mental illness. Dennis Charney and Eric Nestler (eds.) provide such a framework in Neurobiology of Mental Illness, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
24. as does the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, Text Revision-DSM-IV-TR (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
25. Antonio Damasio has presented compelling evidence for the inseparability of cognition and emotion in rational and moral decision-making in Descartes' Error: Reason, Emotion, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994),
26. and The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 1999).
27. Nathalie Camille et al., "The Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the Experience of Regret," Science 304 (2004): 1167-70.
28. Nancy Andreasen, "Linking Mind and Brain in the Study of Mental Illness: A Project for Scientific Psychopathology," Science 275 (1997): 1586-1593.
29. Henrik Walter cites and elaborates on this study in his Neurophilosophy of Free Will, trans. Cynthia Klohr (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 282-83.
30. Damasio describes this case in considerable detail in Descartes' Error, chapter 1.
31. See, for example, L. E. Baxter et al., "Caudate Glucose Metabolism Rate Changes with both Drug and Behavior Therapy for Obsessive Disorder," Archives of General Psychiatry 49 (1992): 687-98.
32. Cited by Walter in Neurophilosophy of Free Will, 292.
33. Mary Beckman describes and analyzes this case in "Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain," Science 305 (2004): 596-99.
34. Here I closely follow Daniel Schacter's account of the Carrie Engholm case in his testimony before the President's Commission on Bioethics, Seventh Meeting, October 17, 2002, Session 3: Remembering and Forgetting: Physiological and Pharmacological Aspects. Transcript: 1-40, at 14-15. From http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/oct02/session3.html.
35. See also Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1996),
36. and Endel Tulving and Martin Lepage, "Where in the Brain Is the Awareness of One's Past?" in Daniel Schacter and Elaine Scarry, eds., Memory, Brain and Belief (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000): 208-28.
37. See Tulving and Lepage, "Where in the Brain Is the Awareness of One's Past?"
38. and Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
39. R. D. Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 1991),
40. and Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths among Us (New York: Pocket Books, 1993),
41. Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (St. Louis: Mosby, 1967),
42. and Carl Elliott, "Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (1992): 223-37.
43. See, for example, M. L. Platt and P. W. Glimcher, "Neural Correlates of Decision Variables in Parietal Cortex," Nature 400 (1999): 233-38.
44. Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 103.
45. "Emerging Ethical Issues in Neuroscience," Nature Neuroscience 5 (2002): 1127.
46. See also Farah and Wolpe, "Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function."
47. Judy Illes points out these and other potential problems with neuroimaging in Brain and Cognition: Ethical Challenges in Advanced Neuroimaging (San Diego: Academic Press, 2003).
48. Also, Illes et al., "From Neuroimaging to Neuroethics," Nature Neuroscience 6 (2003): 250.
49. Illes et al., "Ethical and Practical Considerations in Managing Incidental Neurologic Findings in fMRI," Brain and Cognition 50 (2002): 358-65.
50. The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 221.