The political legislation cycle

Public Choice

Volumn 134, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 201-229

  Lagona, Francesco ^a   Padovano, Fabio ^a  

^a Center for Economics of Institutions   (Italy)

Author keywords

Economic theory of legislation; Negative binomial regression; Political business cycle; Voters

Indexed keywords

EID: 38749124075     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9219-0     Document Type: Article

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