Dynamics of representation: The case of US spending on defence

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 81-103

  Wlezien, Christopher ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030548726     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123400007420     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
2. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
3. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
4. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
5. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
6. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
7. See, e.g., Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976); Alan Monroe, 'Consistency Between Constituency Preferences and National Policy Decisions', American Politics Quarterly, 12 (1979), 3-19; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', American Political Science Review, 76 (1983), 175-90; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright Jr and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who (F'note continued) Governs Military Spending in the United States?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 905-15.
8. Note that this conceptualization of the opinion-policy connection effectively integrates the 'covariation' and 'satisfying' models of congruence offered by Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government. The conceptualization actually has deep roots in political science, including Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). For a more complete development of the thermostatic model, see Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), forthcoming.
9. Note that this conceptualization of the opinion-policy connection effectively integrates the 'covariation' and 'satisfying' models of congruence offered by Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government. The conceptualization actually has deep roots in political science, including Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). For a more complete development of the thermostatic model, see Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), forthcoming.
10. Note that this conceptualization of the opinion-policy connection effectively integrates the 'covariation' and 'satisfying' models of congruence offered by Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government. The conceptualization actually has deep roots in political science, including Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). For a more complete development of the thermostatic model, see Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), forthcoming.
11. Note that this conceptualization of the opinion-policy connection effectively integrates the 'covariation' and 'satisfying' models of congruence offered by Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government. The conceptualization actually has deep roots in political science, including Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). For a more complete development of the thermostatic model, see Christopher Wlezien, "The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), forthcoming.
12. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, Handbook of Social Science, vol. 4 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1964); Donald E. Kinder, 'Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion', in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983).
13. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, Handbook of Social Science, vol. 4 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1964); Donald E. Kinder, 'Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion', in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983).
14. Also see Paul Sniderman, 'The New Look in Public Opinion Research', in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline II (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1993).
15. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public; James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Stoll, US National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Robert H. Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?' American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158-70; Christopher Wlezien and Malcolm Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion', Political Behavior, 15 (1993), 381-405.
16. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public; James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Stoll, US National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Robert H. Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?' American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158-70; Christopher Wlezien and Malcolm Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion', Political Behavior, 15 (1993), 381-405.
17. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public; James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Stoll, US National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Robert H. Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?' American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158-70; Christopher Wlezien and Malcolm Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion', Political Behavior, 15 (1993), 381-405.
18. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public; James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Stoll, US National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Robert H. Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?' American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158-70; Christopher Wlezien and Malcolm Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion', Political Behavior, 15 (1993), 381-405.
19. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public; James Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Stoll, US National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Robert H. Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?' American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 158-70; Christopher Wlezien and Malcolm Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion', Political Behavior, 15 (1993), 381-405.
20. In particular, see Durr, 'What Moves Policy Sentiment?'
21. but also see Stoll, US National Security Policy, and Wlezien and Goggin, 'The Courts, Interest Groups, and Public Opinion about Abortion'.
22. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the US Electorate', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 1-24; William G. Jacoby, 'Public Attitudes toward Government Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 336-61.
23. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, 'Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the US Electorate', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 1-24; William G. Jacoby, 'Public Attitudes toward Government Spending', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 336-61.
24. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).
25. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public.
26. Also see Larry Bartels, 'Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup,' American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 429-56.
27. The model of preferences and policy developed here implies equilibration in both preferences and policy i.e., that when the two variables are out of equilibrium they adjust to each other over time. In effect, the model implies a 'cointegrating' relationship between preferences and policy, which is explicitly considered below.
28. Hartley and Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense'.
29. Roper also asked the same question in the December of every year since 1973 and this data is used in analysis that follows to explore public responsiveness to policy.
30. Note that the percentage of people who think spending is 'about right' varies within a fairly narrow range over time and the percentages of people who think we are spending 'too little' and 'too much' over time are virtual mirror images of each other. Not surprisingly, analyses using the percentage of the public that responds 'too little' or 'too much' separately produce results that differ only marginally from those using the measure of Net Support.
31. See John W. Ellwood, 'Budget Authority vs. Outlays as Measures of Budget Policy,' paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, DC, 1986).
32. Although regular appropriations account for most funding on an annual basis, additional funding often has been provided in supplemental appropriations; see Christopher Wlezien, 'The Political Economy of Supplemental Appropriations', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 18 (1993), 51-76. Note, however, that combining the appropriations into a single measure is complicated by the fact that supplemental are decided well after regular appropriations, and, thus, may reflect more recent information about public preferences. Regular appropriations data were distilled from the Annual Senate Document, Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc. Real dollar values of appropriations were calculated by dividing current dollar values into the gross national product price deflator (1982 = 1.00), from The National Income and Product Accounts. 17 The economic and political measures are based on D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 713-36; Soviet spending measures were drawn from Hartley and Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense'.
33. t-2 for fiscal year 1974, i.e., as the measure of Net Support in 1972. This coding decision poses only negligible consequences for the estimated parameters. Note also that when a variable that captures the change in the federal deficit is included in the model, following Hartley and Russett, 'Public Opinion and the Common Defense', its estimated effect is negative, implying that as the deficit increases defence appropriations also increase. This finding contrasts with Hartley and Russett's result, but the coefficient is far too unreliable to credit.
34. t-2). (F'note continued) are slightly larger when the years 1981-83 are excluded from the analysis, apparently reflecting some level of non-linearity in the responsiveness of both the president and Congress. In effect, institutional actors become slightly less responsive to Net Support as the measure tends toward its upper (or lower) bounds - technically, the measure is bounded by - 100 and 100. Since the estimated non-linearity in institutional responsiveness is minor, the results based on linear specification are reported here.
35. t-1 is included in the model, which is exactly what one might expect if appropriations feed back on Net Support.
36. See, e.g., Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson (F'note continued) and James A. Stimson, 'Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the US Economy', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 597-611. But also see David Sanders, David Marsh and Hugh Ward, 'The Electoral Impact of Press Coverage of the British Economy', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 175-210, for a different formulation.
37. See, e.g., Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson (F'note continued) and James A. Stimson, 'Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the US Economy', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 597-611. But also see David Sanders, David Marsh and Hugh Ward, 'The Electoral Impact of Press Coverage of the British Economy', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 175-210, for a different formulation.
38. See, e.g., Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson (F'note continued) and James A. Stimson, 'Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the US Economy', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 597-611. But also see David Sanders, David Marsh and Hugh Ward, 'The Electoral Impact of Press Coverage of the British Economy', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 175-210, for a different formulation.
39. See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
40. Thus, accounting for any positive simultaneity between changes in appropriations and Net Support, which is not straightforward, can only strengthen the negative, feedback relationship between them.
41. See Fand Abolfathi, 'Threat, Public Opinion, and Military Spending in the United States, 1930-1990', in Patrick McGowan and Charles W. Kegley Jr, eds., Threats. Weapons, and Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980). Also see Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowery, 'Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 155-78.
42. See Fand Abolfathi, 'Threat, Public Opinion, and Military Spending in the United States, 1930-1990', in Patrick McGowan and Charles W. Kegley Jr, eds., Threats. Weapons, and Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980). Also see Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowery, 'Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 155-78.
43. Richard G. Niemi, John Mueller and Tom Smith, Trends in Public Opinion: A Compendium of Survey Data (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989).
44. Neither the GSS nor AIPO asked the question in 1978, so the value in that year represents the average of the values in 1977 and 1979. Excluding the year from the analysis that follows makes virtually no difference to the estimated parameters.
45. Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989). The potential limitation of the measure is most notable in 1991, when Net Support increased in apparent correspondence with American involvement in Desert Storm. Note, however, that the measure of Net Dislike outperforms the more common spending-based indicators of need for defence spending (see fn. 17) in the models of Net Support. Thus, it appears that the measure captures much more information that is relevant to the public demand for spending, such as relates to important real world events that have no basis in spending, e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
46. The positive, statistically significant intercept in Table 3 suggests that the public's preferred level of defence spending tends to increase over time, ceteris paribus. The intercept (7.07), taken together with the coefficient for Appropriations, (1.90), implies that the amount of appropriations the public wants increases by about 3.72 per cent (in real dollars) on an annual basis. In other words, assuming Net Dislike remains unchanged, Net Support will tend to drift upward unless appropriations increase by just less than 4 per cent, which exceeds the average annual growth in the real gross national product. Although the tendency may largely be due to 'income effects', the possibility is not considered here; for a straightforward discussion of income effects, see David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
47. Outlays data were drawn from the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1993 (Supplement, February 1992).
48. Moreover, separate analyses show that the pattern holds across subcategories of education and party identification, implying that the evident responsiveness to appropriations is not driven by a particular segment of the American public.
49. Analysis using cointegration methodology produces results that do not differ meaningfully from those presented herein - see the Appendix. Such public responsiveness must reflect information communicated by the mass media (see fn. 23) or in other ways. For a basic discussion of two-stage information flows, see James A. Stimson, 'The Paradox of Ignorant Voters, but Competent Electorate', in Donald S. Lutz and Kent L. Tedin, eds, Perspectives on American and Texas Politics (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1989). For an interesting assessment of the mediating role of political elites, see Brody, Assessing the President, especially the discussion of how 'rally' events influence presidential approval in the United States.
50. Analysis using cointegration methodology produces results that do not differ meaningfully from those presented herein - see the Appendix. Such public responsiveness must reflect information communicated by the mass media (see fn. 23) or in other ways. For a basic discussion of two-stage information flows, see James A. Stimson, 'The Paradox of Ignorant Voters, but Competent Electorate', in Donald S. Lutz and Kent L. Tedin, eds, Perspectives on American and Texas Politics (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1989). For an interesting assessment of the mediating role of political elites, see Brody, Assessing the President, especially the discussion of how 'rally' events influence presidential approval in the United States.
51. It is apparent in Table 4 that the two (March and December) measures of Net Support differ consistently, which finds expression in the intercepts and error terms. This pattern apparently is due to 'house effects' ; see Tom W. Smith, 'In Search of House Effects: A Comparison of Responses to Various Questions by Different Survey Organizations', Public Opinion Quarterly, 42 (1978), 443-63.
52. t-2.
53. t-1.
54. The number is calculated by dividing the estimated intercept (7.07) by the absolute value of the coefficient for Appropriations (1.90). Also see fn. 31.
55. The numbers were generated by inserting the value of appropriations change (3.72) into the equation described in fn. 37 and then solving the equation for the values of Net Support.
56. Also see Wlezien, 'The Public as Thermostat'.
57. See, e.g., Nathaniel Beck, 'The Methodology of Cointegration', Political Analysis, 4 (1992), 237-48. To determine whether preferences and policy are cointegrated, it is first necessary to assess whether the separate series are integrated. Intuitively, an integrated series is one that is quite long-memoried, where the effects on the variable at a particular point in time become incorporated into future values. Technically, an integrated series is non-stationary, meaning the current change in the variable is unrelated to its lagged level. Dicky-Fuller tests indicate that Net Support and defence appropriations (and Net Dislike of the Soviet Union) are integrated; indeed, the series appear to be first-order integrated. Such series also are referred to as a 'random walk' or 'unit root' process. If Net Support and defence appropriations are cointegrated, then a linear combination of the series (in levels) produces a stationary series, one where the current change is (negatively) related to the lagged level.
58. The procedure used here relies on the discussion in Robert H. Durr, 'An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models', Political Analysis, 4 (1992), 185-228.
59. Although this specification is theoretically satisfying, the implied specification of the model of appropriations change is not. That is, policy makers would be expected to adjust appropriations for year t in response to disequilibria between Net Support and Net Dislike in year t-1 and appropriations for year t itself, an obvious impossibility. This specification 'problem' actually is much more apparent than real, because it is not necessary to estimate an error correction model of appropriations change: (1) policy makers are expected to (and do) respond positively to the level of, not the change in, Net Support in year t -1; and (2) as is implied by the foregoing analyses, and confirmed by the analysis that follows, the public adjusts Net Support immediately in response to appropriations change.