Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance

European Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 877-890

  Höffler, Felix ^a   Sliwka, Dirk ^b  

^a DEUTSCHE TELEKOM LABORATORIES   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Career concerns; Managerial turnover; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT PRACTICE; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT;

EID: 0141744966     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00272-6     Document Type: Article

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