The carbon-neutral individual

New York University Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1673-1745

  Vandenbergh, Michael P ^a   Steinemann, Anne C ^b,c  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^c Mayor's Green Ribbon Commission on Climate Protection   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38049170960     PISSN: 00287881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (408)

1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 5, 49 (2004) (citing WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 90 (2000)).
2. See, e.g., CARBON TRUST, CARBON FOOTPRINTS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: THE NEXT STEP FOR BUSINESS 5 (2006), available at http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/Publications/publicationdetail.htm?productid= CTC616 (noting that carbon offset can be created when one party "buys credits associated with environmental projects that reduce emissions of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases around the world, as a way of offsetting [the party's] own carbon emissions");
3. EcoBusinessLinks, Carbon Emissions Offset, http://www.ecobusinesslinks. com/carbon_offset_wind_credits_carbon_reduction.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007) ("Carbon offsets enable individuals and businesses to reduce the CO2 emissions they are responsible for by offsetting, reducing or displacing the CO2 in another place, typically where it is more economical to do so.").
4. See TerraPass Additionality Project, Tontitown LFG Project Review Document v1.1 (2007), http://terrapass.pbwiki.com/Project%20Review%20Document (evaluating effectiveness of carbon dioxide offset program involving methane capture from landfill).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
6. POSNER, supra note 1, at 161-63.
7. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1297-99 (2001) (arguing that in some large-number, small-payoff collective action problems, individual behaviors are more effectively altered by improving convenience than by influencing social norms);
8. Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 327-28 (2006) (emphasizing importance of studying individual household dynamics in numerous academic fields);
9. Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 428-49 (2006) (arguing that government subsidies for "green" behaviors do not necessarily enhance development of environmental social norms);
10. Anne C. Steinemann, Rethinking Human Health Impact Assessment, 20 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 627, 638 (2000) (highlighting need to include individual health effects in environmental impact assessments);
11. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005) (examining influence of personal and social norms on environmentally significant individual behavior);
12. see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 69-84 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005) [hereinafter NRC, DECISION MAKING] (examining importance of studying environmentally significant individual behavior).
13. John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3, 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983632.
14. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2175 (2007) (regulating automobile tailpipe emissions); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-242.400 (2007) (same).
15. 2 emissions from motor vehicles, that the effect under EPCA and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution is that State regulation of those emissions is preempted.").
16. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450-51 (2007) (describing EPA's argument that Clean Air Act does not require it to regulate tailpipe emissions).
17. The remaining two-thirds of emissions come from industry, commercial sources, and nonindividual transportation. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations, in 5 ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 285, 289-94 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howarth eds., 2005) (arguing that individuals have no moral obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
19. The editors of the New Oxford American Dictionary named "carbon neutral" their Word of the Year for 2006. Oxford University Press Blog, Carbon Neutral: Oxford Word of the Year (Nov. 13, 2006), http://blog.oup.com/ 2006/11/carbon_neutral_.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 201-15.
21. The IPCC is composed of hundreds of scientists organized by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, and its most recent report was approved by the governments of the United States and 112 other countries. Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global Warming is "Unequivocal," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1.
22. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 10 (2007).
23. Id. at 10-12.
24. Carbon dioxide accounted for 84.6% of the carbon dioxide equivalent gases emitted in 2004. John C. Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,003, 10,010-11 n.76 (2007);
25. see also James Hansen & Makiko Sato, Greenhouse Gas Growth Rates, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16,109, 16,111 (2004) (concluding that climate-forcing effects of greenhouse gases in 2003 were result of carbon dioxide (90%), nitrous oxide (5%), methane (4%), and Montreal Protocol trace gases (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) and other trace gases (1%)).
26. Joint Science Academies' Statement: Global Response to Climate Change (June 7, 2005), available at http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005. pdf.
27. Petition from the Union of Concerned Scientists, World Scientists' Call for Action (1997), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/ science/world-scientists-call-for-action-at-the-kyoto-climate-summit.html.
28. See Julia B. Corbett & Jessica L. Durfee, Testing Public (Un)certainty of Science: Media Representations of Global Warming, 26 SCI. COMM. 129, 130-37 (2004) (discussing ways in which media communicates or constructs scientific uncertainty regarding global warming).
29. Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686 (2004).
30. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
31. Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 15.
32. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, TEMPERATURE TRENDS IN THE LOWER ATMOSPHERE: STEPS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RECONCILING DIFFERENCES 2 (2006), available at http://www.climatescience. gov/Library/sap/sap1-1/finalreport/sap1-1-final-all.pdf ("Studies to detect climate change and attribute its causes using patterns of observed temperature change in space and time show clear evidence of human influences on the climate system . . . .");
33. see also Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Report Reconciles Atmospheric Temperature Trends (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/pressreleases/pressrelease2may2006. htm ("[T]he observed patterns of [climate] change over the past 50 years cannot be explained by natural processes alone . . . ."),
34. quoted in Juliet Eilperin, Study Reconciles Data in Measuring Climate Change, WASH. POST, May 3, 2006, at A3.
35. 2 and Antarctic Temperature Changes Across Termination III, 299 SCIENCE 1728 (2003) (discussing analysis of temperature and carbon dioxide concentrations in Vostok ice core in Antarctica); J.R. Petit et al., Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica, 399 NATURE 429 (1999) (same).
36. The chart was prepared by Jonathan Gilligan, Senior Lecturer in the Earth and Environmental Sciences Department at Vanderbilt University. The chart is based on data available from Jean Robert Petit et al., NOAA/NGDC Paleoclimatology Program, Vostok Ice Core Data for 420,000 Years, IGBP PAGES/World Data Center for Paleoclimatology Data Contribution Series #2001-076 (2001), ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/vostok/ deutnat.txt, ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/vostok/ co2nat.txt, which was used for Petit et al., supra note 26, and is used here by permission.
37. Changes in Earth's orbit and other influences are thought to affect both temperature and carbon dioxide levels. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 9.
38. Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were roughly 380 ppm in 2006 and have been increasing at a rate of about 2.0 ppm per year since 2000. James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global Warming Constitutes "Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference?," 68 CLIMATIC CHANGE 269, 277 (2005).
39. 2 in the Past Two Centuries, 324 NATURE 237, 237 fig. 1 (1986);
40. 2 in the Past Two Centuries, 315 NATURE 45, 45 fig.1 (1985).
41. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 12 (based on estimate of 2-4.5°C range and "best estimate" of 3°C). We have converted all temperature change estimates in this Article from degrees Celsius to degrees Fahrenheit by multiplying degrees Celsius by 1.8.
42. See id. at 7, 15 (noting that Arctic warming rate has been higher than global average over past century and predicting future warming to be similar to recent patterns).
43. See id. at 9 (noting that polar average temperatures were 5.4-9°F higher about 125,000 years ago, when sea levels were likely thirteen to twenty feet higher). Although the 5.4-9°F range for polar average temperature increases is higher than the IPCC's prediction for global average increases of 3.5-8°F, the IPCC's best estimate for global average temperature increases (5°F) may yield polar average increases of 10°F. See James Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 12, 13 ("The business-as-usual scenario, with five degrees Fahrenheit global warming and ten degrees Fahrenheit at the ice sheets, certainly would cause the disintegration of the ice sheets.").
44. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 13-14 & tbl.SPM.3.
45. See Hansen, supra note 29, at 274 (asserting that recent studies suggest risk of rapid disintegration of Greenland ice cap); Roger Harrabin, Top Scientist's Fears for Climate, BBC NEWS, Aug. 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5303574.stm (quoting Professor John Holdren as stating that complete melting of Greenland ice cap "could increase world-wide sea levels by 7m (23ft), swamping many cities").
46. 2 forcings must decrease to achieve no more than 1°C temperature increase);
47. James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, SCI. AM., Mar. 2004, at 68, 74-75 (positing that "highest prudent level of additional global warming is not more than about one degree C" to avoid large-scale ice-sheet breakup).
48. Hansen, supra note 32, at 13 (estimating that sea-level rise of eighty feet would inundate Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and most of Florida, and would displace 250 million people in China, 120 million people in Bangladesh, and 150 million people in India).
49. See id. (noting that in past, "once ice sheets began to collapse, [sea levels] rose one meter [about three feet] every twenty years for centuries"); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 13 tbl.SPM.3 (projecting future sea-level rises).
50. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 7 ("At continental, regional and ocean basin scales, numerous long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical cyclones."); Brian C. O'Neill & Michael Oppenheimer, Dangerous Climate Impacts and the Kyoto Protocol, 296 SCIENCE 1971, 1971 (2002) (discussing coral bleaching).
51. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
52. O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1971.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1971-72.
56. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 253-54 (arguing that "a wait-and-see policy would be perilous" because of possibility that "atmospheric concentrations [of carbon dioxide] may reach a level that triggers abrupt, catastrophic global warming"). Although we agree with Judge Posner that abruptness is important because it reduces our ability to adapt, we conclude that abruptness is not a necessary predicate for action regarding some of the low-probability and serious-consequence harms of climate change. For example, sea-level rises in the tens of feet, even if gradual, will not allow for human adaptation on any meaningful level.
57. See PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, DEP'T OF DEF., AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 14-19 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ agency/dod/schwartz.pdf (discussing potential national-security implications of climate change).
58. See Corbett & Durfee, supra note 21, at 132-36 (discussing ways in which media presents scientific uncertainty that tend to underplay degree of scientific consensus).
59. O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (discussing possible dangerous impacts of climate change and emissions reductions needed to avoid them).
60. Hansen, Can We Avoid?, supra note 35, at 965-66 (expressing target temperature change as 1°C, roughly equivalent to 2°F);
61. cf. INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE 3 (2005), available at http://www.whrc.org/resources/published_literature/pdf/ByersetalInstPubPolRes.1. 05.pdf (concluding that increases of 2°C (3.6°F) above recent temperature levels will increase "the risks of abrupt, accelerated, or runaway climate change").
62. See INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, supra note 48, at 4 (suggesting 400 ppm target carbon dioxide level); Hansen & Sato, supra note 18, at 16,114 (concluding that stabilization will require carbon dioxide levels not to exceed 440 to 520 ppm); O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (concluding that stabilization will require carbon dioxide levels not to exceed 450 ppm target).
63. See O'Neill & Oppenheimer, supra note 38, at 1972 (pointing out that it is not certain that stabilization at 450 ppm would forestall disintegration of West Antarctic Ice Sheet).
64. Id. (suggesting that delaying achievement of Kyoto Protocol cumulative emissions target from 2010 to 2020 may require up to "staggering" 8% reduction per year to begin before 2040 and concluding that "such high rates of reduction may be prohibitively costly"); see also Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968-69 (2004) (concluding that near- and mid-term reductions are necessary as stop-gap measure to provide time for "revolutionary technologies" to be developed to achieve more dramatic reductions). 52 Hansen, Can We Avoid?, supra note 35, at 966.
65. See, e.g., ROYAL COMM'N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, ENERGY - THE CHANGING CLIMATE 182 (2000), available at http://www.rcep.org.uk/pdf/ chp10.pdf (recommending 60% reductions in emissions by 2050);
66. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, HOW TO AVOID DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE: A TARGET FOR U.S. EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ global_warming/emissions-target-report.pdf (recommending that industrialized nations reduce emissions 70-80% from year 2000 levels by 2050);
67. see also T.M.L. Wigley, The Climate Change Commitment, 307 SCIENCE 1766, 1768-69 (2005) (concluding that reducing emissions substantially below present levels will be necessary to stabilize global mean temperatures).
68. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/07May/ RL33846.pdf (discussing bills introduced in 110th Congress that would impose controls on emissions through declining emissions caps).
69. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 51, at 968. Pacala and Socolow focus only on carbon dioxide.
70. Editorial, Global Warming and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A12.
71. See Steinemann, supra note 6, at 635 (noting that public concern about health hazards can prompt government agencies to conduct human-health impact assessments); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 610 (2004) (arguing that providing consumers with information about products' environmental impact pressures manufacturers to create more ecofriendly products).
72. Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 517-18.
73. Id. at 524-35.
74. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (requiring EPA to impose pollution control requirements on motor vehicles).
75. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 524-29 (discussing traditional regulatory focus on command-and-control regulations and economic incentives aimed at industrial sources).
76. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2004 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 340 fig.12.2, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038404. pdf [hereinafter EIA, 2004 REVIEW];
77. see also EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2004, at 2-22 to 2-26 (2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/ UniqueKeyLookup/RAMR6MBSC3/$File/06_Complete_Report.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 2006 INVENTORY] (offering similar breakdown of emissions source categories).
78. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KEY GREENHOUSE GAS DATA 44-45 figs.II-12 to II-20 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/key_ghg.pdf.
79. See Paul C. Stern et al., Strategies for Setting Research Priorities, in ENVIRONMENTALLY SIGNIFICANT CONSUMPTION: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 124, 133 (Paul C. Stern et al. eds., 1997) (noting that in analyzing sources of pollution "[o]ne useful strategy is to begin with possible policy interventions").
80. 2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 197 (2005). Our model does not consider the impact of individuals' consumer behavior, see infra note 67, but instead examines the emissions attributable to all behavior under an individual's direct control.
81. We look exclusively at carbon dioxide because approximately 85% of climate forcing is caused by carbon dioxide, see supra note 18, and the data on carbon dioxide are more accessible and reliable across source categories than data on other greenhouse gases.
82. Experts disagree as to whether the carbon dioxide that results from the manufacture of consumed products should count towards an individuals' emissions. Compare The Personal Environmental Impact Calculator, http://ans.engr.wisc.edu/eic/home.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (limiting calculations of individuals' environmental impact to activities over which they have direct control, including transportation choices, recycling habits, home water use, and home energy use), with BROWER & LEON, supra note 65, at 14 ("[W]e vote with our dollars when we choose to buy or not to buy particular products."). Our rationale for including electricity purchased by consumers in the model, but excluding other consumer goods, is consumers' uncertainty regarding the carbon releases from those other goods. For example, it may be difficult for a consumer to know how the emissions from the purchase of a pound of organic chicken from a distant poultry farm compare to the emissions from a pound of pork from a local farm.
83. See Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 539 (arguing that including all emissions generated in course of individuals' employment or in production of consumer goods and services would negate category's utility by enabling all pollution to be attributed to individuals).
84. See infra app.
85. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
86. The U.S. Census Bureau states that there were 281,421,906 persons in the United States in 2000 and an average household size of 2.59 persons per household. U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfinder, http://factfinder.census. gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr= GCT-H6&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=US-9 (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). Dividing the total population by persons per household returns 108.7 million households.
87. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
88. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LONG FORM FOR VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES: INSTRUCTIONS 47-48 (2006), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ FormEIA-1605_2005_Instructions.pdf [hereinafter EIA, LONG FORM] (listing coefficients used to determine amount of carbon dioxide generated by various fuels).
89. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39.
90. We do not account for inefficiency in electricity generation and line loss, making individuals responsible only for their direct energy consumption.
91. See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Electricity Consumption by End Use in U.S. Households, 2001, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ reps/enduse/er01_us_tab1. html [hereinafter EIA, End Use] (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
92. See infra app.
93. See infra app.
94. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 57.
95. EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47-48.
96. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2003 tbl.4-21 (2004), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2003.
97. Seventy-seven percent of passengers reported that their most recent air travel was for nonbusiness purposes. Bureau of Transp. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Airline Passenger Travel, OMNISTATS, Sept. 2003, at 1, 2, available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/omnistats/ volume_03_issue_03/pdf/entire.pdf.
98. As of July 1, 2006, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the U.S. population at 298,217,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 8 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/pop.pdf.
99. 2 emissions in the United States were 20.60 metric tons in 2000. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WORLD PER CAPITA CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE CONSUMPTION AND FLARING OF FOSSIL FUELS, 1980-PRESENT (2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html.
100. The EIA recently issued a press release estimating 2006 carbon dioxide emissions at 5877 million metric tons. Press Release, Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuels Declined by 1.3 Percent in 2006 (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ neic/press/press284.html. Dividing 5877 million metric tons by the 2006 population estimate of 298,217,000, see supra note 83, yields per-capita emissions of 19.70 metric tons of carbon dioxide.
101. See World Res. Inst., Climate Analysis Indicators Tool Version 4.0, http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=gases (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) (requires log-in registration) (providing total of 5,791.1 mega tons, or 12.7 trillion pounds, of U.S. emissions).
102. See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 341 (listing emissions for industrial sector). The 32% share for individual behavior compares favorably to an estimate that households accounted for 32.4% of direct U.S. energy use in 2000, GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 258 tbl.10-1 (2d ed. 2002), and to a study that concluded that individual behavior consumed roughly one-third of U.S. energy and accounted for roughly 40% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 1997, Bin & Dowlatabadi, supra note 65, at 205.
103. See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 386 (defining industrial sector in detail).
104. See id. at 345 tbl.12-4 (giving energy consumption for manufacturing industries using data from 2000 in metric tons, which we converted to pounds).
105. See EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4 (using data from 2000 in metric tons, which we converted to pounds).
106. 2 Emissions, 447 NATURE 1038, 1038 (2007).
107. World Res. Inst., supra note 85. The conversion was performed by multiplying the data available in tons from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool by 2000 pounds per ton.
108. The data in this table were gathered from World Res. Inst., supra note 85. All figures were converted from tons to pounds by multiplying by 2000 pounds per ton.
109. Individual behavior change is an important explicit and implicit part of the "stabilization wedges" approach to emissions reductions proposed by Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow. See Pacala & Sokolow, supra note 51, at 968 (emphasizing human action over reliance on advancement in emission-reducing technologies). They have argued that emissions reductions should be approached by thinking of the reductions as a series of wedges, with each wedge representing an activity that reduces carbon emissions by zero in 2004 but increasing in linear fashion each year for fifty years. Id. By the year 2054, each wedge represents one billion tons of reduced carbon emissions. Id. Pacala and Socolow identify fifteen approaches that each can generate a stabilization wedge. Id. at 969-71, 970 tbl.1. Although the focus of many of their wedges is on the new deployment of existing industrial technologies, several also explicitly involve lifestyle changes. For example, a wedge is available from reducing the average annual miles traveled by cars from 10,000 to 5000. Id. at 969. Another wedge is available from pursuing "known and established approaches" to more efficient heating and cooling, water heating, lighting, and refrigeration in commercial and residential buildings, which implies that consumers will purchase more efficient goods. Id.
110. See NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 81 (noting lack of funding for studies on social influences on energy consumption after early 1980s); see also Telephone Interview with Paul C. Stern, Staff Dir., Nat'l Research Council, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 14, 2006) (describing resumption of interest in household energy consumption as "Rip Van Winkle experience") (notes on file with the New York University Law Review).
111. Paul C. Stern et al., A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism, 6 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 82 (1999).
112. See Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 461, 461-63 (1999) (emphasizing numerous external constraints on consumer behavior). Habits, inconvenience, and resource restraints may be important barriers to consumer behavior change. See GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 111-12, 162-63 (noting examples where programs making conservation more convenient increased proenvironmental behavior);
113. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 78-79 (pointing to studies finding constraints on consumer behavior). 97 See Paul C. Stern & Gerald T. Gardner, Psychological Research and Energy Policy, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329, 333-34 (1981) (noting distinction between constant "curtailment" behavior and one-time "efficiency" behavior).
114. Id. at 331-34.
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 1235 (criticizing overemphasis on social norms to solve environmental problems).
117. See supra tbl.1.
118. EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4. We convert gigagrams (Gg) to pounds. One Gg is equal to 1100 tons, or 2.2 million pounds.
119. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0464 (2005), HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES ENERGY USE: LATEST DATA & TRENDS 53-56 tbl.A1 (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/rtecs/nhts_survey/2001/index.html (using 2001 data demonstrating that SUVs comprise 12% (23.2 million) of total of 191 million vehicles in personal motor vehicle inventory but emit 16% (364 million of 2213 billion pounds) of all carbon dioxide from personal motor vehicles, or 35% more than their share of personal motor vehicle inventory).
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
121. EIA, End Use, supra note 76. The data are for 2001 but should closely resemble 2000 data. It is important to assess emissions from production of new products, but estimates are not available for many household products. We have assumed that products will be replaced as existing equipment wears out.
122. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 259-60 tbl.10-3.
123. See GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 113 (noting that program giving away low-flow showerheads proved effective because it combined convenience with provision of free goods).
124. Electricity use by appliances that are turned off but still plugged in may amount to 5% of household electricity use in the United States and may cost consumers over $3.5 billion annually. JENNIFER THORNE & MARGARET SUOZZO, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., LEAKING ELECTRICITY: STANDBY AND OFF-MODE POWER CONSUMPTION IN CONSUMER ELECTRONICS AND HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES 1 (1998).
125. Airplane contrails trap the heat radiating from the earth at night, but during the day they both trap the earth's heat and reflect the radiant energy from the sun. See David J. Travis et al., Contrails Reduce Daily Temperature Range, 418 NATURE 601, 601 (2002) (explaining that contrails reduce both "solar and outgoing" heat transfer).
126. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Idling Reduction: National
127. See MCKENZIE-MOHR ASSOCS., EARTHCARE SUDBURY, ANTI-IDLING FINAL REPORT 7-8, 13 (2003), available at http://www.city.greatersudbury.on.ca/content/div_earthcare/documents/ sudbury_finalreport.pdf [hereinafter MMA, IDLING] (noting that survey participants believed that they could idle their vehicle for three minutes before they began using more fuel than they would by stopping and starting);
128. MCKENZIE-MOHR ASSOCS. ET AL., BARRIERS TO INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION ACTIVITIES - AN EVALUATION 40-41 (2006), available at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/idling/material/reports-research/ barriers-1999-report.cfm?attr=16 [hereinafter MMA, BARRIERS] (noting consistent findings of idling misinformation).
129. Office of Energy Efficiency, Natural Res. Can., Idling: Myths Versus Reality, http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/communities-government/transportation/municipal- communities/articles/idling-myths.cfm?attr=8 (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).
130. These recommendations are consistent with those of many automakers. For example, a British owner's manual for the 2006 Mercedes-Benz C-Class advises drivers to "[s]witch off the engine in stationary traffic" and to "not warm up the engine with the vehicle stationary." Mercedes-Benz, Interactive Owner's Manual: C-Class Coupe, Introduction Section: Protection of the Environment, http://www4.mercedes-benz.com/e/cars/c-class-c/ betriebsanleitung/vertiefen/N101F1.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
131. A Nissan manual advises drivers to "[a]llow the engine to idle for at least 30 seconds after starting" but also advises drivers to "[a]void unnecessary engine idling." NISSAN USA, 2006 NISSAN ALTIMA OWNER'S MANUAL 5-6, 5-15 to -16 (2005), available at http://www.courtesyparts.com/nissan-manual/pdf/ 2006-Nissan-Altima.pdf;
132. see also OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-F-93-002, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT YOU CAN DO TO REDUCE POLLUTION 3 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/18-youdo.pdf (emphasizing that car owners need not warm up cold engines and should not idle longer than thirty seconds).
133. See Office of Energy Efficiency, supra note 112 ("The notion that idling is good for your vehicle is passé - in fact, it hasn't been the right thing to do since the advent of electronic engines. The truth is that excessive idling can damage the engine.").
134. Canadian drivers reported idling their vehicles for the longest average periods of time when picking up friends or family members (233 seconds), when waiting at a fast-food or ATM drive-through window (160 seconds), and when waiting in the household driveway for a family member (139 seconds). MMA, IDLING, supra note 111, at 7.
135. Office of Energy Efficiency, Natural Res. Can., Idling and Climate Change Go Hand in Hand, http://www.oee.nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/idling/issues/why- idling-problem.cfm? (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
136. We identify the amount of carbon dioxide released per second while idling by averaging data provided in Christopher Frey et al., On-Road Measurement of Vehicle Tailpipe Emissions Using a Portable Instrument, 53 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. 992, 999 (2003). We then develop estimates of the amount of idling per week that occurs from individuals warming their vehicles from a cold start (6.5 minutes) and from individuals idling while waiting (3.25 minutes). We base our estimates on a Canadian survey that reports an average of 4.2 idling events per week at an average of 6.2 minutes per event, for a total of 26 minutes per week for individuals warming their vehicles from a cold start. MMA, BARRIERS, supra note 111, at 37-38. The Canadian survey finds an average of 2.5 idling events per week at an average of 5.2 minutes per event, for a total of 13 minutes per week for individuals idling while waiting. Id. at 39. We multiply both values by the carbon dioxide released per second and convert the results into pounds per year.
137. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 2000 (2001), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/dlchrt.htm.
138. See supra note 102.
139. Burning a gallon of gas generates roughly 19.6 pounds of carbon dioxide; thus, a reduction in idling that generates 12.8 billion pounds of carbon dioxide emissions also would save roughly 640 million gallons of gasoline.
140. EPA, 2006 INVENTORY, supra note 62, at 2-7 tbl.2-4. Values are given by the Inventory in gigagrams (Gg). One Gg is equal to 1100 tons, or 2.2 million pounds.
141. World Res. Inst., supra note 85.
142. See Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 554-56 (describing backlash against motor vehicle driving restrictions designed to protect environment).
143. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74.
144. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 430.32(c) (2007) (imposing efficiency standards on manufacturers of central air conditioners and heat pumps).
145. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74-78.
146. Ginia Bellafante, With Ed, All's Green on the Domestic Front, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at E1. Climate-change believers and skeptics both often downplay the role of individual behavior.
147. Compare Hansen, supra note 32, at 16 (criticizing one scientist's call for individual behavior change because "while appropriate," it "diverts attention from the essential requirement: government leadership"), with Anne Paine, Global Warming Activ ists Unite, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Jan. 8, 2007, at A1 (noting comment from Conservative Enterprise Institute senior fellow that seeking to induce individual behavior change to address climate change is "really silly").
148. Bellafante, supra note 126.
149. Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 201, 203 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991).
150. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing "logic of reciprocity," in which those perceiving that others are cooperating will contribute to public goods, while those perceiving that others are shirking will not cooperate and may engage in costly retaliation);
151. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 366-67 (2003)
152. (introducing "close-knit" and "loose-knit" accounts explaining cooperative behavior and citing Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 21 (1998), which notes empirical evidence suggesting that people reciprocate water conservation efforts of their neighbors).
153. See Cialdini et al., supra note 128, at 203-04, 230-31.
154. See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1104 (distinguishing between personal and social norms); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 67-72 (2003) (distinguishing between internal and external norms). For an overview of norm activation, see Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1120-26.
155. Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1120-26.
156. Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 231-32 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977);
157. see also Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 625, 631-37 (summarizing recent literature on norms within field of law and economics). 134 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 1237-41 (analyzing norms literature and explaining that norms operate either through "sanctions from others" or through "guilt[ ] for failing to conform").
158. See id. at 1238-39 (considering application of personal norms to recycling behavior).
159. E.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2000).
160. E.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
161. Id.
162. Carlson, supra note 6, at 1241.
163. Linda Steg et al., Factors Influencing the Acceptability of Energy Policies: A Test of VBN Theory, 25 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 415, 419 tbl.2 (2005) (examining environmental norms and beliefs among 112 Dutch respondents).
164. Stern et al., supra note 95, at 95.
165. McAdams, supra note 137, at 385.
166. E.g., id. at 395-96.
167. Id. at 384-85; see also id. at 407-08 (examining connection between abstract norm of good parenting and concrete norm of using child safety seat). 145 Id. at 400-08.
168. Stern, supra note 96, at 462-63.
169. Stern et al., supra note 95, at 83-86, 92.
170. Shalom H. Schwartz, Moral Decision Making and Behavior, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 127, 127-39 (Jacqueline R. Macauley & Leonard Berkowitz eds., 1970); Stern et al., supra note 95, at 83-86, 92.
171. Steg et al., supra note 140, at 419 tbl.2.
172. Id.; see also Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, Moral Norms and Environmental Behavior: An Application of Schwartz's Norm-Activation Model to Yard Burning, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 174, 178-81 (1978) (examining strength of AR regarding air pollution from backyard burning).
173. See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1104 (distinguishing social norms and personal norms).
174. See Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 412 (2000) (summarizing literature on how altruistic behavior occurs in response to personal norms).
175. See McAdams, supra note 137, at 400-07 (noting importance of perceived likelihood of enforcement). 154 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) (defining "norm bandwagons" and "norm cascades").
176. J. Stanley Black et al., Personal and Contextual Influences on Household Energy Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 11-14 (1985); Stern et al., supra note 95, at 86.
177. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 39, 71 (Paul C. Stern & Elliott Aronson eds., 1984) [hereinafter NRC, ENERGY].
178. External barriers to behavioral change may explain the price inelasticity of gasoline. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS: BEHAVIORAL ISSUES 18-20 (Paul C. Stern ed., 1985) (examining influence of information on individual energy use);
179. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING ENERGY DEMAND ANALYSIS 27-42 (Paul C. Stern ed., 1984) (examining role of price changes as form of information that influences behavior by gaining individuals' attention and inducing them to reconsider default choices); infra note 198.
180. See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 73 (concluding that understanding norms is "useful for forecasting trends in energy consumption" and for "understanding public support and opposition to energy policies and programs"); Stern et al., supra note 95, at 85-86, 89-90 (concluding that norms influence low-cost behaviors and civic behaviors).
181. But see H.J. Staats et al., Communicating the Greenhouse Effect to the Public: Evaluation of a Mass Media Campaign from a Social Dilemma Perspective, 45 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 189 (1996) (suggesting that knowledge and awareness may be less instrumental in inducing behavioral change than some expect).
182. J. Stanley Black, Attitudinal, Normative and Economic Factors in Early Response to an Energy-Use Field Experiment 272-74 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with University of Wisconsin Library).
183. Black et al., supra note 155, at 17 (concluding that norms have greater influence on noneconomically constrained behaviors than on economically constrained behaviors).
184. Stern, supra note 96, at 469.
185. See, e.g., Steg et al., supra note 140, at 423 (noting that individuals feel more responsible for environmental consequences when they are aware of those consequences); Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1127-28 ("Several studies of environmental behavior support the hypothesis that information about the aggregate effects of individual behavior can activate norms and change behavior.").
186. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 72 (citing Black, supra note 158).
187. Id.
188. See Paul C. Stern et al., Responses to Changing Energy Conditions Among Massachusetts Households, 8 ENERGY 515, 522-23 (1983) (concluding that personal norms are reliable predictors of temperature setbacks but less reliable predictors of low-cost actions, such as weather stripping and minor curtailments, and have weakest relationship to major household investments).
189. See, e.g., Annika M. Nordlund & Jörgen Garvill, Value Structures Behind Proenvironmental Behavior, 34 ENV'T & BEHAV. 740, 751-54 (2002) (finding relationship between abstract proenvironmental norms and feelings of obligation to engage in proenvironmental actions); Steg et al., supra note 140, at 423 (concluding that personal norms have more influence on less costly behaviors such as recycling and energy policy changes than on more costly behaviors such as changes in car or subway use).
190. For a recent overview of the recycling literature, see generally P. Wesley Schultz, Knowledge, Information, and Household Recycling: Examining the Knowledge-Deficit Model of Behavior Change, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 67 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002).
191. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 88.
192. Id. at 88-89. Focusing an individual's attention on descriptive and injunctive norms can also influence littering behavior. Cialdini et al., supra note 128, at 206-32.
193. Joanne Vining & Angela Ebreo, Predicting Recycling Behavior from Global and Specific Environmental Attitudes and Changes in Recycling Opportunities, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1580, 1602 tbl.10 (1992).
194. Annika M. Nordlund & Jörgen Garvill, Effects of Values, Problem Awareness, and Personal Norm on Willingness to Reduce Personal Car Use, 23 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 339, 345 (2003).
195. See, e.g., GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 103-04, 162 (noting that structural barriers to transportation choices can impede proenvironmental behavior even when paired with existence of environmental norms).
196. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1682-83 (2007).
197. Id. at 1683.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Stern et al., supra note 95, at 91.
201. Id.
202. 2 emissions").
203. See supra Part I.C.
204. See Posner, supra note 136, at 1786-91 (concluding that personal norms are uncertain dependent variables not valuable for explaining or predicting behavior); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1638-39 (2000) (noting that norms are highly context-sensitive and vary across particular environments, populations, and circumstances).
205. See, e.g., Steg et al., supra note 140, at 424 (concluding that biospheric and altruistic value clusters are distinct, and that biospheric value clusters are associated with proenvironmental abstract norms); id. at 423 ("VBN theory has been developed to explain behavior taken with proenvironmental intent. It may well be that behaviors such as car and subway use are hardly taken with proenvironmental intent.").
206. See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 64, 71-73 (discussing how variability in personal values affects energy use); Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1119-20 ("[T]he notions that individuals have an obligation to refrain from pouring toxic chemicals into a stream or killing bald eagles or other endangered species are widely (although not universally) held.").
207. See supra text accompanying note 174.
208. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Our Common Future, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 925, 925-26 (2005) (noting that although "he is the antithesis of the stereotype of the parsimonious environmentalist," California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has stated that "the debate is over[, w]e know the science[, w]e see the threat[, a]nd we know the time for action is now");
209. Mark Sanford, Op-Ed., A Conservative Conservationist? Why the Right Needs to Get Invested in the Search for Climate Change Solutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2007, at A19 (Republican governor of South Carolina advocating that climate change debate be reframed to draw on "conservative principles such as responsibility and stewardship").
210. Whether such a moral obligation exists is a contestable point. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 12, at 285-304 (surveying general moral principles and concluding that they do not support derivative moral principle against wasteful driving that emits greenhouse gases).
211. In the criminal and tort law literatures, scholars routinely use the term, often assuming that it is almost uniformly held. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 368 (2005) (discussing role of responsibility in tort law);
212. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468-69 (1997) (discussing role of moral obligation and personal responsibility in compliance with criminal law).
213. Holly Doremus has noted the importance of building a sense of "individual responsibility" toward the environment. Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 234, 253-56 (2003).
214. See, e.g., Jerald M. Jellison and Jane Green, A Self-Presentation Approach to the Fundamental Attribution Error: The Norm of Internality, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643, 645 (1981) (showing that social approval increases linearly with expressed internality);
215. Gifford Weary et al., The Attributional Norm of Internality and Depressive Sensitivity to Social Information, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1283, 1286 (1985) (concluding that "the greater the personal responsibility accepted by the actor for his outcome, the more favorably he was evaluated by observer-subjects").
216. See Pascal Pansu & Daniel Gilibert, Effect of Causal Explanations on Work-Related Judgments, 51 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: AN INT'L REV. 505, 513 (2002) ("[W]hen attempting to present a favorable self-image, participants selected more internal explanations that were effort-related than trait-related.").
217. Individuals look more favorably upon others who take personal responsibility for their behavior, whether in the form of stating that those individuals can control their behavior (efficacy) or that their actions affect outcomes (locus of control). See, e.g., Jellison & Green, supra note 187, at 645 (showing that social approval increases linearly with expressed internality); Kenneth A. Wallston et al., Hocus-Pocus, the Focus Isn't Strictly on Locus: Rotter's Social Learning Theory Modified for Health, 16 COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 183, 193-94 (1992) (noting influence of efficacy as well as locus of control); Weary et al., supra note 187, at 1286 (finding observers evaluate actors more favorably the higher the degree of personal responsibility attributed by the actor).
218. A search in July 2006 using the Google search engine and the search term "personal responsibility site: Heritage.org" yielded 1330 hits on the website of the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org. We did not attempt to develop a denominator for this figure, and we make no assertion about the relative rate with which conservative and liberal commentators reference personal responsibility.
219. See, e.g., Dennis Prager, Co-Director, Empower Am., Lecture at the Heritage Foundation: The American Tradition of Personal Responsibility (Sept. 20, 1994), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/ PoliticalPhilosophy/HL515.cfm (arguing that Founders exhibited commitment to personal responsibility).
220. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42 U.S.C.).
221. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Beyond Personal Responsibility, CATO INST., May 17, 2004, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=4530 (criticizing efforts by lawmakers to expand healthcare coverage).
222. In an op-ed published after we conducted our research, Mark Sanford, the Republican governor of South Carolina, linked personal responsibility and climate change. See Sanford, supra note 184 (noting that climate change is causing some people to lose "their rights and freedoms because of the actions of others").
223. In general, personal responsibility was less commonly referenced by liberal commentators in our study, although we did not attempt to account for the total number of publications generated. A July 2006 search using the term "personal responsibility" on two liberal think tanks' websites (the Open Society Institute, http://www.soros.org, and the Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org) yielded only ninety-five hits.
224. For example, Ralph Nader's website has argued that although the Republican Party "routinely calls for personal responsibility on the part of the people, it seems to have little interest in corporate responsibility." Eroding Americans' Last Defense: The Civil Justice System, NADER PAGE, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.nader.org/ interest/020405.html.
225. See, e.g., Peter Edelman et al., Reconnecting Disadvantaged Young Men: An Introduction, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/kfiles/ b1549629.html (arguing that social policies must be enacted to widen disadvantaged youth's educational and economic opportunities before personal choice has real value).
226. Structural limitations may be particularly responsible for the growing inelasticity of gas consumption. A recent study concluded that the rise in gas prices over the 2001-06 period reduced consumption by only 4%, as compared to the more than 30% reduction generated by similar increases in 1975-80. Jonathan E. Hughes et al., Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand (Inst. of Transp. Studies, Working Paper No. UCD-ITS-RR-06-16, 2006), available at http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/ publication_detail.php?id=1050;
227. see also NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 39 (noting in 1984 that "gasoline consumption is more responsive to price signals than energy for residential consumption").
228. The difference may have been that the U.S. population became much more suburbanized and reliant on cars between 1975 and 2001. The average annual miles driven per household increased from 12,036 in 1977 to 21,171 in 2001. Lisa Margonelli, Pipeline Blog, Who Cares About the Price of Gas?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, http://pipeline.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/who- cares-about-the-price-of-gas (registration required) (concluding that "we have demonstrated that we can't or won't respond rationally to high prices, so taxes will not push conservation"). Important structural limitations also exist for household energy use. Many home buyers have little choice of appliances when they buy houses, and renters typically have little control over the heating and cooling systems used in their apartments.
229. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 117-20.
230. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 51-52.
231. At least one recent article in the popular press explicitly linked the purchasing of offsets to a sense of personal responsibility and quoted one individual as saying, "I like the idea that I pollute this much, so I pay this much." Christine Larson, A New Way to Ask, "How Green is My Conscience?," N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, § 3, at 6.
232. The growing awareness of climate change in America is reflected in public-opinion polls, although climate change continues to rank well below Iraq, the economy, and health care in terms of political importance. John J. Fialka, Global Warming Pushes Politicians to Mark Positions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at B2.
233. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, What's Kind to Nature Can Be Kind to Profits, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at G1 (discussing widespread corporate interest in carbon neutrality).
235. Anthony DePalma, Gas Guzzlers Find the Price of Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at A1 (noting that beliefs about air emissions appear to be influencing personal carbon-offset market).
236. See supra note 13.
237. The companies that have declared a firm-wide carbon-neutrality goal include: (1) Ben & Jerry's, DePalma, supra note 203; (2) HSBC, Braden Phillips, Paying the Freight for Polluting the Air: Europe Takes the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, at F8;
238. (3) News Corporation, Louise Story, The Hidden Life of Paper and Its Impact on the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at C3;
239. (4) Marks and Spencer (a UK grocer and department store), John Willman, M&S Chief Wins "Eco-Plan" Praise, FIN. TIMES (London), July 3, 2007, at 4;
240. (5) Saab Australia, Press Release, Saab Austl., Saab Drivers Go Carbon Neutral (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://www.saab.com.au/main/AU/en/ pressreleases/4/index.shtml;
241. (6) Salesforce.com, Gavin Clarke, Salesforce.com Goes Carbon Neutral, REGISTER (London), Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.theregister. co.uk/2007/01/18/salesforce_carbon_trading;
242. (7) Silverjet, Andrew C. Revkin, Carbon-Neutral Is Hip, but Is It Green?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, § 4, at 1;
243. and (8) Timberland, Jad Mouawad, A Few Companies Take Special Steps to Curb Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at C1.
244. BP contributes to offset registered customers' travel emissions in the United Kingdom when they purchase BP gas. James Daley, BP Targets Green Consumers with Carbon-Offset Scheme for Drivers, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 23, 2006, at 37, available at http://news.independent.co. uk/business/news/article1221122.ece.
245. For example, for a 2% premium on its usual shipping charge, DHL offsets all emissions from transport to make its delivery and logistics services carbon neutral. Morning Edition: Europe's Carbon Trading Market Sees Brisk Business (NPR radio broadcast June 5, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10716772 (follow "listen" hyperlink for audio recording).
246. Similarly, Pacific Electric & Gas allows customers to add a monthly charge to their electric bill that is used to purchase offsets for the greenhouse gas emissions from their electricity use. See Rebecca Smith, California Kindles Green Energy; Ahead of New Standards, Utilities Push Use of Cleaner Resources, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at A2;
247. see also Press Release, Ford Motor Co., Ford and TerraPass Create Program To Help Drivers Reduce Greenhouse Gas (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://media.ford.com/newsroom/feature_display.cfm?release=22971 (describing Ford's pilot program with TerraPass to allow customers to purchase offsets for greenhouse gas emissions from driving);
248. Damon Darlin, Dell Says Plant a Tree, Help the Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at C6 (noting that Dell donates money from computer sales to funds promoting offsets);
249. Michelle Higgins, Raising the Ante on Eco-tourism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 5, at 12 (describing trend of travel companies, including Expedia and Travelocity, to purchase carbon offsets to allow travelers to compensate for carbon dioxide production from trips);
250. Tom Arnold, Testing TerraPass on the Shelf at Sam's Club, TerraPass Blog, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.terrapass.com/blog/posts/2007/01/testing-terrapass- on-the-shelf-at-sams-club.html (noting Sam's Club's bundling of TerraPass with pressure washer purchases in order to offset carbon dioxide emissions).
251. Stephanie Peatling, A Worthy Goal: AFL to Ban Greenhouse Gases, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 19, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/afl-puts-its-energy- into-greener-goals/2006/09/18/1158431644199.html (Australian Football League); Wald, supra note 202 (National Football League and World Cup).
252. For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council has offset the emissions from electricity use at its Washington, D.C., office. Antonio Regalado, New Lifestyle Option for the Eco-Minded: Carbon-Neutral, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2004, at B1.
253. Press Release, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Pacific Gas and Electric Company Energizes Governor's 2007 Inaugural "Green Dream" Celebration (Jan. 4, 2007), available at http://sev.prnewswire.com/oil-energy/20070104/ SFTH04404012007-1.html.
254. Matthew Chapman, Green Government Plan "a Fiasco," BBC.COM, Oct. 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/6092460.stm (describing efforts to make 2006 G8 Summit carbon neutral).
255. Eduard Goldberg, New Zealand Prime Minister Announces Plans To Make Country "Carbon Neutral," Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), Feb. 23, 2007.
256. 2, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at A4.
257. British Columbia To Trim Greenhouse Gases, Go Carbon Neutral, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 14, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2007/2007-02-14-02.asp.
258. Village Aims To Be Carbon Neutral, BBC.COM, Jan. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/merseyside/6275323.stm (reporting village of Ashton Hayes's intention to become carbon neutral).
259. American College & University Presidents Climate Commitment, http://www.presidentsclimatecommitment.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
260. See, e.g., Personal Emissions Calculator, http://www.epa.gov/ climatechange/emissions/ind_calculator.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (enabling users to "estimate [their] household greenhouse gas emissions" and "identify ways to reduce [their] personal greenhouse gases").
261. See generally J. Paul Padgett et al., A Comparison of Carbon Calculators, 27 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. (forthcoming 2007) (comparing ten U.S.-based individual carbon-emissions calculators).
262. TERRAPASS, COMMENTS ON CENTER FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS GREEN-E GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCT STANDARD 1 (2007), available at http://www.terrapass.com/images/blogposts/ TerraPass%20CRS%20comments.pdf;
263. CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO RETAIL CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS iii (2006), available at http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsets.pdf.
264. TERRAPASS, supra note 217, at 7.
265. James Kanter, Guilt-Free Pollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at C1.
266. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74.
267. See EcoBusinessLinks, supra note 2 (surveying prices among carbon-offset providers). Of course, carbon offsets are a viable means of reducing individuals' carbon footprint only if the offsets actually offset other emissions. For a discussion of the criticisms of carbon offsets, see infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., TerraPass, TerraPass Products for Your Car, http://www.terrapass.com/road/products.road.all.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (selling carbon offsets for midsize motor vehicle for $49.99). For a general discussion of carbon offsets, noting that "[c]arbon offsets typically include renewable energy, energy efficiency and reforestation projects," see EcoBusinessLinks, supra note 2.
269. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 80, 92.
270. Id. at 86-87.
271. See, e.g., Reneé Weber & Jennifer Crocker, Cognitive Processes in the Revision of Stereotypic Beliefs, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 967-68 (1983) (concluding that removing stereotype by attempting in piecemeal fashion to disconfirm individual beliefs associated with that stereotype is more effective than attempting to remove stereotypes by altering entire belief system at once).
272. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 47.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 47-48 (contrasting "psychological reactance" seen with forced energy-saving restrictions to relative lack of resistance seen when people are given "freedom and control" over such restrictions).
275. See Ken Caldeira, Op-Ed., When Being Green Raises the Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A21 ("We cannot afford to indulge ourselves with well-intentioned activities that do little to solve the underlying problem.");
276. Stephanie Gruner, Future Forests Trades Trees for Emissions - Critics Say Firm Oversimplifies Issue, Lets Polluters Off Hook, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2000, at B4B (noting that some environmentalists claim that "the science behind carbon-forestry programs is faulty").
277. For example, a recent study raises questions about the benefits of planting trees outside of tropical latitudes. Seran G. Gibbard et al., Climate Effects of Global Land Cover Change, 32 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L23705 (2005).
278. Keith Bradsher, Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut
279. See CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at iii (noting that carbon-offset providers vary in quality).
280. CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, DRAFT: GREEN-E GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCT STANDARD (2006), http://www.resource-solutions.org/mv/docs/DRAFT_Green- e_GHG_Product_Standard_for_Stakeholder_Comment.pdf. 234 Padgett et al., supra note 216.
281. The latter concern is sometimes expressed by analogizing offsets to the religious indulgences offered in the Middle Ages. See Charles Krauthammer, Limousine Liberal Hypocrisy, TIME, Mar. 26, 2007, at 24, 24 (referring to offsets as "ecological indulgences"); Revkin, supra note 205 (noting that some environmentalists compare carbon offsets to indulgences). This concern has a moral cast, suggesting that achieving carbon neutrality through anything other than reductions in personal emissions is somehow fraudulent or immoral. The analogy is false, however. Indulgences raised money but did not provide the advertised benefit. Offsets can be genuine, and genuine offsets do provide the benefit advertised. In addition, although in theory the availability of offsets could reduce the moral stigma associated with carbon emissions, no widespread moral stigma currently is associated with these emissions. Given the ubiquity of carbon emissions, the stigma may not emerge unless some standard develops to identify the level at which emissions become harmful. Widespread adoption of the carbon-neutrality norm may begin to establish the standard at zero, even if the norm allows the standard to be achieved through emissions reductions and offsets. 236 See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1118-19 (describing reciprocity norm).
282. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Regalado, supra note 208 (noting that some "think the idea [of carbon neutrality] will take off only when carbon costs are built into a product's price").
284. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 57, at 593-94 (discussing effects of cognitive dissonance and habits on environmentally significant behaviors).
285. For an analysis of possible approaches to creating "equity offset" programs that address the distributive justice problem, see generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke Ackerly, Climate Change and Individual Behavior: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
286. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
287. 2 Sequestration Years Away in Coal-to-Fuel Plant Study, INSIDE EPA, Jan. 19, 2007 (noting that Department of Energy environmental impact statement concluded that carbon-sequestration technology is "years away");
288. Surge in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Forecast as World Energy Demands Rise Through 2030, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at A-2 (June 21, 2006) (noting comments of EIA Administrator that he does not see important role for hydrogen energy until after 2030).
289. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 76-77 (noting that information can be "instrumental" in changing carbon-emitting behaviors when combined with taxes and other incentives and in some cases can increase effectiveness of incentives by factor of ten).
290. 2 Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1995). Taxes may be an efficient way to influence individual behavior and may have effects soon after being imposed. Taxes also create incentives for corporations that further leverage the taxes' influence on individual behavior. For example, taxes that provide incentives for individuals to purchase fuel-efficient cars also provide incentives for manufacturers to market auto fuel efficiency. During the 1979 energy crisis, automakers spent roughly $100 million on fuel-economy advertising.
291. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 82. In addition, the most important function of taxes may be to create incentives for the development of new technologies. POSNER, supra note 1, at 258-59. For a discussion of the role of subsidies in encouraging carbon reductions, see id. at 159-60, 259, and Green, supra note 6, at 424-40.
292. See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 41-42 (discussing problems with information for energy users).
293. Id. at 36-39 (citing studies).
294. Id. at 36.
295. For example, a 1983 study concluded that a price differential between 2:1 and 8:1 accounted for only 2% of the variation in home electricity use, largely because consumers lacked information about the variable prices. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 109 (noting that perception that reducing peak demand was moral obligation accounted for 11% of variation). Households that received an enhanced information package as compared to the standard utility information package reduced their peak energy use by 16% more than those that received the standard package. Id.
296. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 443-44 (2005) (describing range of common biases and irrational behaviors that affect environmentally significant consumer choices);
297. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 314-16 (discussing several cognitive biases that affect willingness to support government action to address climate change).
298. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 249, at 444.
299. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (providing early formulation of public choice theory and description of barriers to collective action toward common interest). Cap-and-trade schemes for industrial pollutants may reduce emissions attributable to individual behavior by reducing the emissions from the utilities from which individuals buy their electricity and from the manufacturing plants that produce consumer goods. Manufacturers, however, are not likely to encourage conservation measures when such measures conflict with their economic interests, which often lie with increased product and energy use.
300. See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 42-43 (describing these mixed and conflicting incentives among producers).
301. POSNER, supra note 1, at 118 ("[A] politician who wants to raise taxes today to minimize the risk of catastrophes a thousand years hence will be cutting his throat."). Despite widespread support for climate change measures in California, a 2006 ballot measure that would tax oil production - yet not affect gasoline prices at the pump - failed by a vote of 55% to 45%. Aaron S. Edlin, If Voters Won't Go for Taxing Oil To Conserve Energy, How Do We Do It?, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Nov. 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/art2. Boulder, Colorado, appears to be the only jurisdiction in the United States to have adopted a carbon tax.
302. Katie Kelley, City Approves "Carbon Tax" In Effort to Reduce Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at A13.
303. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Scholars unfortunately have given only limited attention to how public support can be generated to put traditional regulatory measures in place. See Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 172, at 1684-92 (discussing societal barriers to more sensible climate policies, including irrational assessment of distant future risks).
304. Government efficiency standards typically take the form of mandated efficiency standards for home appliances and efficiency standards or emissions standards for motor vehicles. See John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 19 (2007) (discussing U.S. efforts to boost energy efficiency of appliances, buildings, and motor vehicles).
305. Jack N. Barkenbus, Putting Energy Efficiency in a Sustainability Context: The Cold Facts About Refrigerators, 48 ENVIRONMENT 10, 13-16 (2006) (describing refrigerator efficiency and demand trends and noting that overall electricity used by refrigerators "has remained comparable in absolute terms").
306. Id.
307. William Saletan, Planet of the Indoor People, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2006, at B2. 258 Dernbach, supra note 254, at 24-26.
308. Saletan, supra note 257. The trends are not limited to the United States. A decade ago, only 25% of new cars in France had air conditioning; today the figure is 75%. Lawrence J. Speer, Vehicle Air Conditioning in France Worsening Climate Change, Environment Agency Finds, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA), June 30, 2003.
309. See Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicles: Revisions to Improve Calculation of Fuel Economy Estimates, 71 Fed. Reg. 5426, 5428-30 (proposed Feb. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86 & 600) (proposing use of new emission tests to account for changes in Americans' driving behavior).
310. Unfortunately, U.S. government agencies, unlike their Canadian counterparts, have been reluctant to promote public policies like conservation through information campaigns. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 74-80.
311. Studies demonstrate that mere hortatory calls to change environmentally significant behavior that do not provide information on the consequences of that behavior are typically ineffective at changing environmental norms. Id. at 73 (citing Peter Ester & Richard A. Winett, Toward More Effective Antecedent Strategies for Environmental Programs, 11 J. ENVTL. SYSTEMS 201 (1982);
312. Paul C. Stern & Gerald T. Gardner, Psychological Research and Energy Policy, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329 (1981)).
313. See generally CARL A. ZIMRING, CASH FOR YOUR TRASH: SCRAP RECYCLING IN AMERICA 81-101 (2005) (discussing scrap drives and scrap recycling industry during World War II and other periods).
314. Attempts to use more direct regulatory approaches aimed at individual consumption, such as the creation of personal carbon accounts, have been suggested in the United Kingdom. See Rob Edwards, The New Idea for Tackling Climate Change: Carbon Cards, SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 1, 2006, at 16 (describing proposal to create carbon accounts for all adults that would ration "carbon units" corresponding to energy usage).
315. See, e.g., NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 96-98 (describing importance of credibility to information campaigns and proposing strategies for bolstering campaign credibility).
316. GARDNER & STERN, supra note 86, at 114, 115 fig.5-3 (citing study finding much higher consumer response to marketing strategies showing higher degrees of government support).
317. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1139-46 (describing Toxics Release Inventory).
318. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000)).
319. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a).
320. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 313(j), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j) (requiring EPA to "establish and maintain in a computer data base a national toxic chemical inventory" and to "make these data accessible by computer telecommunication and other means").
321. See Vandenbergh, supra note 6, at 1142 & nn.177-80 (describing media coverage).
322. Id. at 1142-43.
323. Id. at 1144-45 & n.195 (citing James T. Hamilton, Is the Toxics Release Inventory News to Investors?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 292 (2001);
324. James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98 (1995);
325. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Does the Market Value Environmental Performance?, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 281, 289 (2001);
326. Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997)).
327. The ICRI is modeled on, and could easily be incorporated into, the proposed Individual Toxics Release Inventory. Id. at 1149; see also Dernbach, supra note 254, at 36 & n.131 (discussing carbon footprint modeled on proposed Individual Toxics Release Inventory).
328. We assume for the purposes of this discussion that Congress would delegate responsibility to the EIA, which already collects and publishes much of the data necessary to assemble an ICRI.
329. See supra Part II.A.
330. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
332. NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 74-75.
333. 2 emissions labels for all new cars and discussing similar initiatives outside United States);
334. 2 emitted during production, delivery, and consumption);
335. see also Ian Herbert, Carbon Footprint of Products To Be Displayed on Label, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 16, 2007, at 22, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate_change/ article2362754.ece (describing initiative to provide labels detailing "carbon footprint" of products).
336. Although policymakers have taken limited steps to use public information campaigns to reduce personal motor vehicle idling, a sophisticated, far-reaching effort has not been conducted in the United States. For policy proposals to reduce idling, see MMA, BARRIERS, supra note 111, at 54-58.
337. See infra Part V.D.
338. See supra Part IV.B.1.
339. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 131, at 88-99 (noting that human health and environmental norms may have distinct effects on behavior).
340. Kim Krisberg, Climate Change Predicted To Have Dire Effects on Health, NATION'S HEALTH (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2007, at 1.
341. OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY AND CAFE REFORM FOR MY 2008-2011 LIGHT TRUCKS 64-65 (2006), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/Rulemaking/Rules/ Associated%20Files/2006_FRIAPublic.pdf.
342. Id.
343. See V. Kerry Smith et al., Can Public Information Programs Affect Risk Perceptions?, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 41, 57 (1990) (suggesting that quantitative assessments more effectively promote accurate assessments of risk from radon exposure).
344. See, e.g., Jon Gjerde et al., Optimal Climate Policy Under the Possibility of a Catastrophe, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 289 (1999) (providing overview of probabilities and costs associated with catastrophic climate change and proposing model for determining probabilities of catastrophe).
345. 2 emissions substantially than to suffer and risk the consequences of failing to meet this challenge.").
346. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
347. See Rachlinski, supra note 249, at 299-303 (discussing "social traps" that can discourage collective action).
348. Efforts that rely on charitable contributions often provide measures of public recognition. An example is the tree-planting movement in Israel, which offers certificates for those who sponsor the planting of trees in the desert. Trees for the Holy Land, http://www.treesfortheholyland.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). Many of these charitable programs, however, do not confront the temporal trap presented by climate change because the donors and donees are currently living.
349. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
351. GlobalGiving, http://www.globalgiving.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
352. GlobalGiving, How It Works, http://www.globalgiving.com/howitworks.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
353. For a discussion of an "equity offset" scheme along these lines proposing a carbon offset market feature that would enable donors to subsidize the purchase of efficient goods by individuals at or near the poverty line, see generally Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 240.
354. See CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at 21-23 (dividing offset providers into top-tier and non-top-tier based on quality of emissions reductions, and calling for more transparency from all providers).
355. Concerns about carbon offsets have stimulated a congressional request for an inquiry by the Federal Trade Commission. Patricia Ware, Markey Lauds Trade Commission's Decision to Review Effectiveness of Carbon Offsets, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-1 (Aug. 14, 2007).
356. See Padgett et al., supra note 216 (manuscript at 4-5, on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that differences in carbon-calculator outputs may influence amount of effort individuals devote to reducing carbon emissions and types of steps they take).
357. TerraPass is an example of a for-profit firm that offers a carbon calculator and sells offsets. TerraPass, http://www.terrapass.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
358. See Ware, supra note 299 (reporting that FTC will consider self-regulatory efforts of carbon-offset market as part of its review of environmental marketing claims).
359. Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 48-49 (2006).
360. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 955-56 (2007).
361. See CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, supra note 233, at 2 (proposing private "Green-e standard for Greenhouse Gas Products").
362. See, e.g., CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, supra note 217, at 15-20 (private group ranking top carbon-offset providers).
363. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. The Agricultural Extension Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture may be well positioned to play this role in some communities. One institution worth further consideration is the Department of Energy's Residential Conservation Service (RCS). During the last energy crisis, the RCS played a leading role in information campaigns to reduce individual and household energy use, but the service was largely dismantled early in the Reagan Administration. See NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 53 n.4 (describing general pressure to deregulate in 1981 and its effects on RCS).
364. E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 11002(b) (2000) (limiting statute's requirements to facilities with substances above established thresholds).
365. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 12 n.4 (citing data from March 1981).
366. Id.
367. See id. at 74-75 ("[G]overnment officials have generally been unwilling to build energy information programs on principles of effective communication.").
368. See Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, 21 ENVIRONMENT 14, 17, 38-39 (1979) (discussing how experts' biases cause them to underestimate risks and develop inadequate safeguards).
369. See Robert B. Cialdini, Basic Social Influence Is Underestimated, 16 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 158, 159 (2005) (describing how leaders consistently underestimate persuasive power of others' behavior despite social science research on issue);
370. Robert B. Cialdini et al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SOC. INFLUENCE 3, 5 (2006) (detailing government information campaigns ignoring current understandings of social influence).
371. Cialdini et al., supra note 313, at 10-11.
372. Id. at 12.
373. NRC, ENERGY, supra note 156, at 68 (relating example of weighing friend's experience with car over respected consumer magazine's opinion of car).
374. See id. at 74-80 (describing current ineffectiveness of government information programs).
375. Knowing that waste or poor management could eviscerate support for public works programs, President Franklin D. Roosevelt put strong controls in place for the New Deal agencies. See Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 484-86 (1994) (describing Roosevelt's aggressive stance towards independent agencies).
376. See NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 6, at 69 (advocating federal agency support for "concerted research effort" on environmentally significant individual behavior).
377. Paine, supra note 126.
378. To ensure consistency, the data used in the model are from 2000 unless otherwise stated.
379. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Occupied Housing Characteristics: 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov (click "Data Sets" on left side of page; then click "Geographic Comparison Tables"; then select geography type of "Nation" and table format of "United States - States; and Puerto Rico"; then click "Show Result") (last visited Aug. 18, 2007). We divide each data set given "per household" by 2.59 persons per household.
380. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 392 (emphasis removed).
381. Id. at 385.
382. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 322.
383. Email from Robert Adler, Energy Info. Admin., Dep't. of Energy, to Paul Padgett, Graduate Student, Vanderbilt Univ. (June 23, 2006) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
384. See id. ("Electricity is itself the result of using other fuels to generate it.").
385. See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 382 (defining "electricity retail sales").
386. Id. at 39 tbl.2.1b.
387. 2 per million Btu = 657 billion lbs. produced from the primary consumption of natural gas. The 128.129 coefficient for natural gas was determined by averaging the coefficients of the two natural gases (pipeline natural gas and propane) that are used by households.
388. 2 per person from primary natural gas consumption.
389. See EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 223 (showing 2004 fuel consumption at power plants). We assume that the distribution of fuel use did not change from 2000 to 2004, and we use these figures to calculate the relative 2000 fuel use at power plants.
390. Id. at 39.
391. See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47-48 (listing conversion factors).
392. D&R INT'L, LTD., 2005 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK 4-4 (2005), available at http://buildingsdatabook.eren.doe.gov/docs/2005bedb-0805.pdf (prepared for Office of Planning, Budget Formulation & Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Energy).
393. EIA, End Use, supra note 76.
394. Id.
395. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 223 (showing that fossil fuels account for 28.25 quadrillion Btu out of total of 40.7 quadrillion Btu consumed to generate electricity in United States).
396. 2 = 211.0185 billion kWh of emission-producing electricity consumption. See EIA, End Use, supra note 76 (showing 304.5 billion kWh consumed by kitchen appliances in 2001).
397. See text accompanying note 77.
398. EIA, 2004 REVIEW, supra note 62, at 394 (emphasis removed).
399. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 103, at 53-56 tbl.A1.
400. 2 per person. See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47, for conversion factors.
401. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2003 at tbl.4-21 (2003), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2003/pdf/ entire.pdf.
402. Seventy-seven percent of passengers reported that their most recent air travel was for nonbusiness purposes. See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 82, at 2.
403. EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47.
404. 11 x 0.77 x 156.258 ÷ 281,421,906 = 857 lbs. of carbon dioxide per person.
405. N. Am. Transp. Statistics Database, Table 4-1: Energy Consumption by Mode of Transportation, http://nats.sct.gob.mx/nats/sys/tables.jsp?i=3&id=14 (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).
406. See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 47.
407. N. Am. Transp. Statistics Database, supra note 348. 351 See EIA, LONG FORM, supra note 73, at 53 (listing conversion factors for units of measure).
408. See id. at 47 (listing emission coefficients for different energy sources).