Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: Specialization and niche formation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4698 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 29-40

  Berenbrink, Petra ^a   Schulte, Oliver ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bayesian games; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY; ROUTING ALGORITHMS;

BAYESIAN PARALLEL LINKS GAME; EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGIES (ESS); NASH EQUILIBRIA; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS;

EID: 38049050366     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_5     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

1. Berenbrink, P., Goldberg, L.A., Goldberg, P., Martin, R.: Utilitarian Resource Assignment. Journal of Discrete Algorithms 4(4), 567-587 (2006)
2. Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: The price of anarchy of finite congestion games. In: Proc. of the 37th Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 67-73 (2005)
3. Czumaj, A., Vöcking, B.: Tight Bounds for Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Proc. 13th Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 413-420 (2002)
4. Ely, J.C., Sandholm, W.H.: Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory. Games and Economic Behavior 53(1), 83-109 (2005)
5. Etessami, K., Lochbihler, A.: The Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity 55 (2004)
6. Fabrikant, A., Luthra, A., Maneva, E.N., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: On a network creation game. In: Proc. of 22nd Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC 2003), pp. 347-351 (2003)
7. Fischer, S., Vöcking, B.: On the Evolution of Selfish Routing. In: Albers, S., Radzik, T. (eds.) ESA 2004. LNCS, vol. 3221, pp. 323-334. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
8. Gairing, M., Monien, B., Tiemann, K.: Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. In: Proceedings of the 18th Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), pp. 1-20 (2002)
9. Harsanyi, J.C.: Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian Players', Parts I, II, and III. In: Management Science, vol. 14, pp. 159-182, 320-334, 486-502 (1967)
10. Kearns, M.S., Suri, S.: Networks preserving evolutionary equilibria and the power of randomization. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 200-207. ACM, New York (2006)
11. Kontogiannis, S., Spirakis, P.: The Contribution of Game Theory to Complex Systems. In: Bozanis, P., Houstis, E.N. (eds.) PCI 2005. LNCS, vol. 3746, pp. 101-111, Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
12. Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C.H.: Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Meinel, C., Tison, S. (eds.) STACS 99. LNCS, vol. 1563, pp. 404-413. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
13. Mavronicolas, M., Spirakis, P.: The Price of Selfish Routing. In: Proc. of the 33rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 510-519 (2001)
14. Smith, J.M.: Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1982)
15. Nash, J.F.: Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proc. of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48-49
16. Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: How Bad is Selfish Routing? Journal of the ACM 49(2), 236-259 (2002)
17. Sandholm, W.H.: Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing. Review of Economic Studies 69, 667-689 (2002)
18. van Damme, E.: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin (1991)
19. Weibull, J. (ed.): Evolutionary Game Theory. The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA (1995)