Legal cultures, legal paradigms and legal doctrine: Towards a new model for comparative law

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 495-536

  Van Hoecke, Mark ^a   Warrington, Mark ^a  

^a Katholieke Universiteit Brussel   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011214731     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589300062163     Document Type: Article

References (133)

1. K. Zweigert and H. K¨tz, Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd revised edn (transl. T. Weir), 1987).
2. The same approach is to be found in the most recent German edition: Ein-führung in die Rechtsvergleicnung (1996), see esp. pp.33–35.
3. Idem (1987), pp.36–37.
4. Idem, p.68.
5. Idem, p.69.
6. But some a great deal earlier, see e.g. R.J.A. de Seife, “Comparative Law: A Problem Solving Technique”(1980) 28 Chitty's LJ. 60, esp. 61
7. Gutteridge, Comparative Law (2nd edn, 1949), p.12
8. J. Hall, “Methods of Sociological Research in Comparative Law”, in J. N. Hazard and W. J. Wagner (Eds), Legal Thought in the United States of America Under Contemporary Pressures (1970), pp.149–169
9. H. Izdebski, “Le rôle du droit dans les sociétés con tempo rames: Essai d'une approche sociologique du droit compart” (1968) Rev. int. de dr. comp. 563
10. W. J. Kamba, “Comparative Law. A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 23 I.C.L.Q. 485, esp. 513–515
11. J. H. Merryman and D. S. Clark, Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems. Cases and Materials (1978)
12. F. S. C. Northrop, “The Comparative Philosophy of Comparative Law” (1960) 45 Cornell L.Q. 617
13. F. F. Stone, “The End to be Served by Comparative Law” (1951) 25 Tulane L.Rev. 325.
14. J. Bell, “English Law and French Law-Not So Different?” (1995) C.L.P. 69
15. J. H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: an Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (1969)
16. M. Krygier, “Law as Tradition” (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237.
17. P. Le grand, “Uniformity, Legal Traditions, and Law's Limits” (1996–1997) 2 Juridisk Tidskrift 306,316–318
18. “Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory” (1995) 58 M.L.R. 262,272–273, “Comparatists-at-Law and the Contrarian Challenge” (inaugural lecture at Tilburg University) (to be published)
19. G. Samuel, The Foundations of Legal Reasoning (1994), p.28
20. B. Markesmis, The Gradual Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences, and English Law on the Eve of the 21st Century (1994), p 2.
21. The Chair for which Pierre Legrand has been appointed at the University of Tilburg in 1994 is called the chair of Comparative Legal Cultures. Culture is a rather vague concept Legrand, idem (1995), p.263, defines it as the framework of intangibles within which individuals operate in a given society.
22. He also refers to Alisdair Maclntyre's definition: schemata which are at one and the same time constitutive of and normative for intelligible action by myself and are also means for my interpretations of the actions of others: “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science” (1997) 60 The Monist 453.
23. For an analysis of the (imprecision of) the concept of legal culture, on the basis of Lawrence Fried-marm's writings, see R. Cotterrell, “The Concept of Legal Culture”, in D. Nelken (Ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (1997), pp. 13–31.
24. Legrand, “Comparatists at Law”, Comparing Legal Cultures, at p.16
25. with reference to J. Hill, “Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory” (1989) 9 Oxford J. Legal Studies 106.
26. J. Bell, “Comparative Law and Legal Theory”, in W. Krawietz, N. MacCormick and G. H. von Wright (Eds), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal Sywems (1995), pp.19–31.
27. Bell, Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal Sywems, at p.70.
28. Kötz, in his foreword to KOtz and Zweigert (1996), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal Sywems, at p.v, enthusiastically writes that, following the collapse of Soviet communism and the almost complete disappearance of the “socialist legal family” in the world, that edition could be reduced by 60 pages.
29. Cf. “on a whole host of issues English law is closer to French law than it is to German law (e.g. breach of contract, vicarious liability, transfer of property in corporeal movables) while on others (e.g. the need to balance free speech versus human privacy) English and German law may have much more in common in terms of shared values than English law has with the law in the United States”: B. S. Markesinis, Foreign Law & Comparative Methodology. A Subject and a Thesis (1997), p.13.
30. And this was the case before the common law countries (UK and Ireland) joined the EC in 1972.
31. Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] E.C.R. 1–4921.
32. For an interesting comparative overview, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Poland as European countries and Argentina and the US as non-European countries, see D. N. MacCormick and R. S. Summers, Interpreting Statutes. A Comparative Study (1991).
33. Pepper v. Han [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (HL).
34. Cf. e.g. “When I started the learning of the Japanese legal system, it was taught by the teachers as received from Western countries”: M. Chiba, “Toward a Truly International Sociology of Law through the Study of the Legal Pluralism Existing in the World”, in A.-J. Amaud (Ed.), Legal Culture and Everyday Life (1989), pp.129–136, at p.131.
35. A long-standing Asian influence led Russian (legal) culture to contain, till now, more characteristics of Asian (legal) culture than of the Western one. For concrete field research which shows this intermediate position of Russian legal culture, see J. Sanders and V. L. Hamilton, “Legal Cultures and Punishment Repertoires in Japan, Russia, and the United States” (1992) Law & Society Rev. 117.
36. F. Wieacker, “Grundlagen der Rechtskultur”, in S. Jörgensen et al. (Eds), Tradition and Progress in Modern Legal Cultures (1985), pp.176–190, at p.182.
37. Wieacker is distinguishing three mam characteristics of Western legal culture: personalism, legalism and intellectu-alism (idem, p.185). Actually, what he means by personalism is covered by the concept of individualism we are using, whereas legalism and intellectualism are clearly representing the characteristic we call rationalism.
38. R. Dekkers, “Meetkunde en verzoening” (1966–1967) Rechtskundig Weekblad 129.
39. The Japanese writer Noda characterises Western law as the “law of the geometric mmd” and the opposite of the Japanese “Law of the subtle mind”: “The Far Eastern Conception of Law” (1971) 2 Int Encyclopedia of Comp.L., 120.
40. See also Ch. Kim and C M. Law-son, “The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law” (1979) 28 I.C.L.Q.491.
41. For an example where this concept is applied, see Barclays Bank plc v. O 'Brien [1993] 4 All E.R. 417,424a and b.
42. As is well known, Hans Kelsen tried to develop a “Pure Theory of Law”, in which norms were strictly separated from facts and in which legal norms were strictly separated from moral, political or other non-legal norms. This explains why the Kelsenian theories are hardly known in most Asian legal cultures: from a non-rationalist point of view such theories are not only uninteresting, they cannot, or at least not really, be understood (A. Kaufmarm, “Vergleichende Rectitsphilosophie-am Beispiel der klasstschen chrnesischen und der klas-sischen abendlāndischen Rechtskultur”, in B. Pfister and M. R. Will (Eds), Festschrift fur Werner Lorenz zum siebzigsten Gebunstag (1991), pp.635–648, at p.642: “Die Reine Rechts-lehre Kelsens ist ihnen weitgehend unzugänglich”).
43. Kung Fu-Tzu, better known in the West as Confucius, lived in China from 551–479 BC Confucianism was imported into Japan and imposed on its people under the reign of the Tokogawa dynasty (1600–1867). This religion partly mixed with existing religions: Buddhism and Shinto, a pantheist religion of Japanese origin and strongly oriented towards nature. In China there was some influence from the movement, called Legalism, which placed more emphasis on the importance of rules, but had only a limited influence (see for a historical overview G. D. MacCormack, “Law and Punishment: The Western and the Traditional Chinese Legal Mind”, in N. MacCormick and P. Birks(Eds), The Legal Mind (1986), pp 235–251).
44. See, on the influence of Buddhism on the Chinese legal culture, L. T. Lee and W. W. Lai, “The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist and Buddhist” (1978) 29 Hastings LJ.1307.
45. J. Escarra gives the following examples: wearing warm clothes in summer or light clothes in winter could bring cold temperatures in summer and warm temperatures in winter. Executions can better be organised in autumn than in spring, because this fits better with the biological cycle: “La conception chrnoise du droit” (1935) 1/2 Archives de Philosophic du Droit 11.
46. See also Kim and Lawson, Archives de Philosophic du Droit, at pp.493–494.
47. The Japanese do not bring proceedings easily. They do so only after having tried all other methods of dispute resolution without success: Y. Taniguchi, “Between Verhand-lungsmaxime and Adversary System-in Search for Place of Japanese Civil Procedure”, in P. Gottwald and H. Printing (Eds), Festschrift für Karl Heinz Schwab zum 70. Geburtstag (1990), p.496.
48. In fact, the highest ideal of a chün-tze (gentleman) is to show oneself capable of a sense of proportion and moderation in all circumstances. Compromise or yielding with propriety is always far more important in China than invoking personal rights and privileges: Lee and Lai, Festschrift für Karl Heinz Schwab zum, at p.1310.
49. See on the weak position of the judiciary in Japan, and the importance of reconciliation, M. Oki, “Schlichtung als Institution des Rechts. Em Vergleich von europâischem und japanischem Rechtsdenken” (1985) 16 Rechtstheorie 151.
50. In traditional Korea a yangban (member of the ruling class) who was in mourning (which often lasted for a period of three years) was punished if he came personally to the court to institute a lawsuit, and his suit would not even be received (see Dai-Kwan Choi, “Western Law in a Traditional Society Korea” (1980) 8 Korean J.Comp.L. 177,181–182).
51. J. Llompart, “Japanishes und Europäisches Rechtsdenken” (1985) 16 Rechtstheorie 131,145.
52. See M. Miaille, Introduction critique à I'étude du droit (1976), pp.292 et seq.
53. L. Rosen, “Equity and Discretion in a Modern Islamic Legal System” (1980–1981) 15 Law & Society Rev. 217,223.
54. Idem, pp.227–228.
55. As R. Dekkers, Discours Rectoraux (1970), p. 19, has noted: “The Bantu is not an individualist like the European. What would be the fate of the individual in Africa, left to his own devices, without the support of the applied sciences or modern techniques? At the risk of dying, he has to be member of a group, his family, his tribe, in order to defend himself against nature.”
56. “Disputes arising often have to be solved by some form of arbitration. The wmner-take-all phenomenon gives way in Africa to a sort of give-a-little-get-a-little phenomenon”: J. B. Ojwang, “European Law in Africa: Wherefore?”, in Jörgensen et al., Discours Rectoraux, pp.141–147, at p.142.
57. “To violate the law of the land duly enacted or ‘consecrated’ is to incur human and supernatural disfavour. Ill-fortune, sickness or death could be the result of an unlawful act. All these traditional Africa views and beliefs make enforcement of a law all the more unnecessary”: F. U. Okafor, “Legal Positivism and the African Legal Tradition” (1984) International Philosophical Quarterly 157,161.
58. J. Vanderlinden, “Aspects de la règie de droit dans I'Afríque traditionelle”, in Ch. Pererman (Ed.), La règie de droit (1971),p.l41.
59. Seealso Ojwang, La règie de droit, where he states that African law is marked by an exceptional appearance of informality, as compared e.g. with most European legal systems.
60. A. Watson, Legal Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (1974), p.5.
61. Northrop, An Approach to Comparative Law, at pp.657–658.
62. Kamba, An Approach to Comparative Law, at p.511.
63. An Approach to Comparative Law
64. An Approach to Comparative Law
65. For a criticism of the Western character of the concept of human rights from an Indian point of view, see R. Panikkar, “Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?” (1982) 120 Diogenes 75.
66. R. Saleilles, “Conception et objet de la science juridique du droit comparé”, in Procès-verbaux et documents du Congrès international de droit compart (Paris 1900), 2 vols. (19051907), Vol.1, p.173.
67. See also R. David, Le droit comparé Droits d'hier, droits de demain (1982), p.12
68. L.-J. Constantmesco, Traité de droit compart, Vol.1: Introduction au droit comparé (1972), p. 135.
69. For a criticism of the possibility of universal rights in a culturally divided world, see F. Belvisi, “Rights, World-Society and the Crisis of Legal Universalism” (1996) Ratio Juris 60.
70. Mitsukuni Yasaki, “Legal Culture m Japan, Modem-Traditional”, in Jorgensen et at., Ratio Juris, pp.191–195, at p.191.
71. Which is the definition of “legal culture” provided by John Bell and quoted Ratio Juris text accompanying n.11.
72. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edn, 1970).
73. Within legal theory some attention has been paid to the concept of paradigm, albeit roughly limited to the question of the historical development of legal science and the question to what extent legal science has been faced with scientific revolutions. See e.g. A. Aarnio et al, Paradigms, Change and Progress in Legal Dogmatics (1983)
74. A. Aarnio, “On the Paradigm Articulation in Legal Research”, in I. Tammelo and A. Aamio, Zwn Fortschritt von Theorie und Technik in Recht und Ethik (1981), pp.45–56
75. J. Wroblewski, “Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics and the Legal Sciences”, in Z. Ziemtrinski (Ed.), Polish Contributions to the Theory and Philosophy of Law (1987), pp.75–88
76. A. Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification (1983), pp. 129–134
77. E. Zuleta Puceiro, Paradigma dogmatico y ciencia del derecho (1981).
78. M. Flodin, “The Possibility of Revolution in Legal Science”, in Z. Bankowski (Ed.), Revolutions in Law and Legal Thought (1991), pp.175–182
79. J. Uusitalo, “Legal Dogmatics and the Concept of a Scientific Revolution”, in Bankowski, idem, pp.113–121
80. M. Jori, “Paradigms of Legal Science” (1990) Rivista Intemazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 230.
81. Specifically on the historical development of science, from the point of view of paradigm, see W. Krawietz, “Zum Paradigmenwechsel im juristischen Methodenstreit”, in W. Krawietz et al. Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudent (1979), pp.113–152
82. N. E. Simmonds, “Law as a Rational Science” (1980) Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 535.
83. See also H. H. Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im būrgerlichen Recht (1983).
84. B. S. Markesmis, “A Matter of Style” (1994) 110 L.Q.R. 607,610,n.22.
85. In three decisions: 19 Jan. 1989 (1989) 106 B.G.H.Z. (Entscheidungen des Bundes-gerichtshofs in Zivilsachen)
86. 28 Feb. 1989 (1990) 107 B.G.H.Z. 92
87. 16 Mar. 1989 (Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht, 1989, p.626). It is interesting to note that in all three cases the lowest courts, three different Landgerichie, decided in the same way as the Bundesgerichtshof but the three courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) decided in the opposite way.
88. BVerfG 19 Oct 1993 (1994) 89 B.Verf.G.E. (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-sungsgerichts) 214,234.
89. Tumbull & Co. v. Duval [1902] A.C 429 (PC).
90. Scott LJ in Barclays Bank plc v. O'Brien [1992] 4 All E.R., 983, 993e
91. (see also the summary in the decision of the House of Lords, All E.R., at pp.42lj-422b).
92. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in idem [1993], pp.431j-432a.
93. Examples of such strongly morally laden, unwritten general principles of law accepted by courts in many European countries are: the good faith principle, or the prohibition of abuse of law (see M. Van Hoecke, “The Use of Unwritten Legal Principles by Courts”, (1995) Ratio Juris 248).
94. “This appeal… raises yet again a problem that has been before the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions over the past ten years or so” (Scott LJ in Barclays Bank plc v. O 'Brien, Ratio Juris, at p.986).
95. “For some ten years the civil courts have had to deal more and more with cases in which young adults end up in a situation of high debts with no way of repaying them, because they have stood as a security for high bank loans for their partner or parents, although they had only a low income.” (“Seit etwa zehn Jahren werden die Zivilger-ichte zunehmend mit Fallen befasst, in den en junge Erwachsene in ausweglose Ûberschul-dung geraten sind, weil sie für hohe Bankkredite ihrer Partner Oder Eltern gebürgt hatten, obwohl sie nur über geringfügige Einkünfte verfügten”) (Bundesverfassungsgericht 19 Oct. 1993 (1994) 89 B.Verf.G.E., 215).
96. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), pp.77–96.
97. O. Kahn-Freund, “Introduction”, in K. Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions (1949), p.10.
98. As e.g. the Kapauku tribe in Papua did, as recorded by Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law. A Comparative Theory (1971), pp.274–302, with a diagram at p.295.
99. The recent House of Lords decision in While v. Jones [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187 provides evidence of the increasing tendency of certain judges to refer to academic doctrine (see esp. Lord Goff at pp.202–203).
100. This is in marked contrast to the traditional position, no doubt still shared by some English judges, where “It is to my mind much to be regretted, and it is a regret which I believe that every judge on the bench shares, that text books are more and more quoted in court”: Union Bank v. Münster (1887) 37 LR.Ch. 51,54 (per Kekewkh J).
101. This, of course, does not mean that there once necessarily will be a “European Civil Code” or an “African Civil Code”, etc. Today, much more emphasis is laid on other, more modest approaches. E.g. Walter van Gerven puts forward his vision of such a long-term approach: making use of multinational casebooks as one important element in the creation of a common law of Europe. See generally “The Case Law of the European Court of Justice and National Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanisation of Private Law” (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 367.
102. Jean Bodin defined “souveraineté as “la puissance absolue et perpétuelle d'une Répu-btique” (the absolute and eternal power of a republic): De la République (1583), Book I, chap. VIII, p.122.
103. E.g. see Arts.85 and 86 of the EC Treaty and the following Council Directives: 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1993) O.J. L95/29
104. 94/47/EEC on Right to Use Immovable Property on a Trmeshare Basis (1994) O.J.L. 280
105. 90/314/EEC on Package Travel, Package Holidays, and Package Tours (1990) O.J. L158/59.
106. European Court of Human Rights, 13 June 1979.
107. Other examples of important decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of family law, all to be found in the Recueil des Arrêts et Decisions de la Cour européenne des droits de I'homme, Series A, are: Johnston v. Ireland, No. 112 (divorce)
108. F. v. Svntzertand, No. 128 (right to remarry)
109. Olsson v. Sweden, No. 130 (family separation)
110. Eriksson v. Sweden, No. 156 (placement in a guest family and right to visit).
111. Case 152/84 Marshall v. South Hants AHA [1986] E.C.R. 732
112. Case 188/89 Foster v. British Gas plc [1990] 3 All E.R. 897.
113. J. Bell, The English Lawyer in the Europe of 1993” (1992) 34 U. Leeds Rev. 181, 182–184
114. and U. Leeds Rev., at pp.73–74.
115. See, for Belgian law, A. Van Mensel, “L'attitude des juges beiges face au divorce par repudiation” (1990) Revue du droit des étrangers 176.
116. See A. Aarnio, Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence (1983), pp.163–184
117. see also A. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechawissenschaft (1979), pp.49–50, where lie defines legal doctrine as “the science of meanings”.
118. For some examples of the influence of the “floodgate factor” in English common law, see J. Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983), pp.70–71 and 217–218.
119. [1972] 3 W.L.R. 502.
120. [1991] 1 A.C 398.
121. “If claims for economic loss were permitted for this particular hazard, there would be no end of claims. Some might be genuine, but many might be inflated or even false” (Lord Denning in Spartan Steel &. Alloys Ltd v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd [1973] 1 Q.B. 27).
122. But not only in the English legal system. The same argument plays a similar role in the area of pure economic loss in the Netherlands (see R. J. P. Kottenhagen, “Buiten-contrac-tuele aansprakelijkheid voor economische schade. Een rechtsvergelijkende studie naar aan-leiding van recente ontwikkehngen in het Engelse (bouw-)recht omtrent de mogelijkheden tot vergoeding van economic loss claims” (1991) Bouwrecht 339)
123. and in Austria (see W. Posch, “Der imgeschotzte Strombezdeher als Fall des mittelbaren Schadens in der Recht-sprechung des OGH” (1973) Juristische Blätter 564; decision of the Oberste Gerichtshof, Z. V.R. 1979, p.93), but not at all in Belgium, France or Germany. Again the difference is not between common law and civil law, but appears to follow unexpected geographical lines.
124. Aulis Aarnio (1983), Juristische Blätter, at p.216, defines a legal doctrinal theory as “a set of concepts and propositions which systematize legal norms in a certain way”.
125. See, on the problem of a common language in comparative law, M. Van Hoecke, “Hohfeld and Comparative Law” (1996) 9 IntJ. for the Semiotics of Law 185, esp. 188–201.
126. Samuel, IntJ. for the Semiotics of Law, at p.84
127. with reference to R. Blanché, L 'épistémologie (3rd edn, 1983),pp.64–65.
128. H. Collins, “Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law” (1991) 11 Oxford J. Legal Studies 396,397.
129. See for some other examples of foreign influences on English law T. H. Bingham, “There is a World Elsewhere: The Changing Perspectives of English Law” (1992)41 I.C.L.Q. 513,522–528.
130. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Art3(l).
131. H. Collins, “Good Faith in European Contract Law” (1994) 14 Oxford J. Legal Studies 229.
132. Oxford J. Legal Studies
133. This is what the Japanese sociologist of law and comparatist Masaji Chiba has called the “identity postulate” of a legal culture: “The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture”, in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft Nr.30 (1988).