Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 427-439

  Ginsburg, Douglas H ^a,b,c  

^a US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 31144453830     PISSN: 17446414     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhi017     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. Interview with Mario Monti, published in EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ publications/special/interview_monti.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (Clayton Act "bring[s] to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys general' on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate").
3. Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater & Gil Evan-Shoshan, Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (Aug. 31, 2004) (comparative report), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/ private_enforcement/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf.
4. See DG Competition website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/others/private_enforcement/index.html.
5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Arts. 81 & 82, Dec. 24, 2002, C 325/33, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/ 12002E_EN.pdf.
6. U.S.C. 1§
7. see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-70 (1911).
8. U.S.C. 2§
9. see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Regulation No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), L 24/1 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/1_024/ 1_02420040129en00010022.pdf.
11. 15 U.S.C. 1§8.
12. 15 U.S.C. 4§5.
13. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 727 (5th ed. 2002).
14. 15 U.S.C. §15, 26.
15. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1972).
16. 15 U.S.C. §15c-h.
17. U.S.C. 1§5e provides, "Monetary relief in an action under section 15c(a)(1) of this title shall (1) be distributed in such manner as the district court in its discretion may authorize; or (2) be deemed a civil penalty by the court and deposited with the State as general revenues; subject in either case to the requirement that any distribution procedure adopted afford each person a reasonable opportunity to secure his appropriate portion of the net monetary relief." There is a dearth of case law evaluating what constitutes an "appropriate portion of the net monetary relief"; in New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), a district court approved a settlement in which the proceeds went to public and non-profit organizations rather than to the persons injured because the administrative costs of any distribution scheme were prohibitive.
18. Id. at 537 n.2.
19. A person on whose behalf a parens patriae action is brought may not later file an individual action unless he opted out of the State's case. See 15 U.S.C. 1§5c(b)(3).
20. See Pub. L. No. 94-503, 1§16, 90 Stat. 2415 (1976), omitted by Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 167 (1979).
21. See Antitrust Law Developments 5th at 803.
22. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code. 4§8.30.020 (anti-compact law specific to insurance industry).
23. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. tit. 62, 4§501 (prohibiting bid-rigging)
24. Pa. Stat. tit. 73, 2§13 (prohibiting below-cost sales)
25. see also Antitrust Law Developments 5th at 810.
26. See id. at 809.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 400 (1927) (citing decisions of several state courts condemning as unlawful price-fixing agreements without regard to reasonableness of the fixed price).
28. The Justices in the years immediately following the Sherman Act's passage "not only were aware of state developments but also invoked recent antitrust-related state decisions as important supporting authority on a number of occasions in early federal antitrust cases." James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 495, 506 (1987) (citing cases).
29. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (invalidating state law in conflict with Sherman Act 1§).
30. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (Maryland statute prohibiting producer or refiner of petroleum from operating retail gasoline station not preempted by Clayton Act or Robinson-Patman Act).
31. See U.S. Department of Justice, Vertical Restraint Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,105 (1985).
32. See Nat'l Ass'n of Attys. General, NAAG Vertical Restraint Guidelines 2§.1, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 49 (BNA) No. 1243, at 996 (Dec. 5, 1985) (treating resale price maintenance agreements as per se unlawful)
33. see also Michael DeBow, State Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and a Modest Reform Proposal, in Competition Laws in Conflict, at 270 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004) (highlighting different enforcement policies of federal and state antitrust agencies)
34. Kevin J. O'Connor, Antitrust Enforcement Regarding Vertical Restraints by State Attorneys General, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Mar. 7-9, 2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/state-antitrust/ atenforcementvertical.pdf.
35. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
36. 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
37. See Antitrust Law Developments 5th at 811.
38. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
39. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d. 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (approving settlement pursuant to the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. 1§6(e), and ordering comparable remedial decree as to plaintiff States that refused to settle), aff'd sub nom., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
40. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 877 (2003) (contending state involvement in Microsoft litigation "lengthened the lawsuit, complicated the settlement process, and increased both legal uncertainty and litigation costs")
41. Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in Competition Laws in Conflict, at 258 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004) (asserting that "coordination costs ... [were] a factor in the length of time it took to settle the Microsoft litigation").
42. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
43. See California v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting claim that merger violated state law, notwithstanding that FTC approved merger; did not decide whether state law was preempted by federal law).
44. The Antitrust Division's appropriation for FY 2005 was almost $139 million. See Dep't of Justice, Budget and Performance Summary, 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/publications.htm.
45. The FTC's FY 2005 appropriation for the purpose of maintaining competition was more than $89 million. See Federal Trade Commission, Budget Summary, 2006, at 13, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary06.pdf.
46. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra n.30, at 889.
47. See id.
48. See Barry E. Hawk & Lorraine L. Laudati, Antitrust Federalism in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Lazo Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 18, 30 (1996)
49. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., website, NAAG Projects: Antitrust, available at http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-antitrust.php.
50. See, e.g., New York v. Marsh & McLennan, No. 04403342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., compl. filed Oct. 14, 2004, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ press/2004/oct/oct14a_04_attach1.pdf.
51. See EC Merger Regulation, Art. 1.
52. see also Commission Notice: Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, ¶11, C 101/07 (Apr. 27, 2004) ("Articles 3(1) and 3(2) do not apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger control laws").
53. Regulation No. 1/2003, Art. 3(3) provides: Without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger control laws nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
54. See generally Anita Raghavan, John Caneyrou & Gautam Naik, Sanofi to Swallow Aventis in a Deal Set at $65 Billion - French Government Played Pivotal Role in Its Desire for a 'National Champion,' Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at A1
55. Floyd Norris, France Strikes a Nationalist Note on Sanofi-Aventis, Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 26, 2004, at 11.
56. See generally Uta Harnischfeger & Hugh Williamson, Breakthrough for German Gas Utility Monopoly Ruling, Fin. Times, July 5, 2002, at 7.
57. The United States is not necessarily immune from concerns other than competition driving a matter ordinarily in the province of antitrust law. An example is playing itself out now, with the attempt of Cnooc Ltd., a Chinese oil company, to purchase the American energy company, Unocal Corp. Treasury Secretary John Snow stated recently that it is likely a review of the transaction will be necessary to determine whether it threatens national security. See Neil King Jr., Greg Hitt & Jeffrey Ball, Oil Battle Sets Showdown Over China, Wall St. J., June 24, 2005, at A1.
58. Summary of Observations on the White Paper on Reform of Regulation 17, ¶6.1 (Feb. 29, 2000).
59. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
60. For a useful example at the international level, consider the attempted merger of GE and Honeywell. See generally Philip Shishkin, Barred Merger Signals U.S.-E.U. Divergence, Wall. St. J., July 5, 2001, at A4.
61. See generally Karl M. Meessen, Competition of Competition Laws, 10 Nw. J. Int'i. L. & Bus. 17 (1989-90).
62. See Waelbroeck, Slater & Evan-Shoshan, supra n.3, at 1.
63. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2004, Table C-2, available at http:// www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C02Mar04.pdf.
64. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 35 (1976) ("The burgeoning of the private antitrust action has induced enormous, and I think justified, concern about the overexpansion of the antitrust laws and their increasing use to retard rather than promote competition")
65. see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1984) (asserting the "inhospitality tradition of antitrust" is a costly feature of antitrust enforcement because it tends to deter innovative market practices).
66. See generally William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Penalty Reform: An Economic Analysis 3-28, 43-50 (1986)
67. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust In The New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 935(2001)
68. Michael L. Denger & D. Jarrett Arp, Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System Promote Sound Competition Policy?, 15 Antitrust, Summer 2001, at 41, 43
69. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652, 678 (1983)
70. R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? 2-6 (June 8, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id-784805.
71. See R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis, 3-6 (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=775245.
72. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
73. Id. at 489.
74. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,767 n.14 (1984) (emphasis in original).
75. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961-68,
76. also permits recovery of treble damages. See 18 U.S.C. 1§964(c).
77. Bo Vesterdorf, Judicial Review in EU Competition Law - Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement, 2 Comp. Pol'y Int'l (forthcoming 2005).
78. See generally Breit & Elzinga, supra n.49, at 3-28
79. see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 15 J.L. & Econ. 133 (1992)
80. Landes, supra n.49, at 678
81. Michael K. Block, Frederick C. Nold & J. Gregory Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 429 (1981)
82. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
83. See United States v. Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
84. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
85. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Leah Brennan, Determinants of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, 2 Comp. Pol'y Int'l (forthcoming 2005).
86. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 Antitrust L.J. 67, 71 (1991).