Trade liberalization, outsourcing, and the hold-up problem

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 225-241

  Ornelas, Emanuel ^a,b   Turner, John L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^b IBMEC Business School   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Hold up problem; International trade; Investment effect; Outsourcing; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

BILATERAL AGREEMENT; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INVESTMENT; OUTSOURCING; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE LIBERALIZATION;

EID: 37349017264     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.02.005     Document Type: Article

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