Why do companies use performance-related pay for their executive directors?

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 521-533

  Bender, Ruth ^a,b  

^a CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Corporate governance; Institutional theory; Legitimacy; Motivation; Remuneration

Indexed keywords

EID: 8644259134     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00391.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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