Contractual holdup and legal intervention

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 325-354

  Shavell, Steven ^a,b  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749100024     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/511892     Document Type: Article

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