Introduction to special issue of social epistemology on "collective knowledge and collective knowers"

Social Epistemology

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 209-216

  Mathiesen, Kay ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36248981332     PISSN: 02691728     EISSN: 14645297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02691720701673934     Document Type: Review

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