Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 639-688

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Budget control; Conflict; Contest success function; Cyber war; Information sharing; Interdependence; Security breaches; Security investment; Social planner; Social welfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 36148982304     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.10.001     Document Type: Article

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