Does the world need more Canada? The politics of the Canadian model in constitutional politics and political theory

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 606-638

  Choudhry, Sujit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35649027870     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mom028     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (149)

1. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
2. WILL KYMLICKA, FINDING OUR WAY: RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
3. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
4. BARRY, supra note 1, at 309.
5. Id. at 313.
6. Id.
7. Supra note 2, at 3.
8. Id. at 2-3.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. Guy LaForest, The True Nature of Sovereignty: Reply to My Critics Concerning Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, in CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS 308 (Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
14. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE POLICIES (United Nations Development Programme 2004) (background paper to UNDP Human Development Report 2004).
15. DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
16. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (Cornell Univ. Press 1983).
17. Stephen Tierney's work is a notable exception. See, e.g., STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
18. KYMLICKA, supra note 2, at 135.
19. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (Yale Univ. Press 1977).
20. DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2d ed., Univ. Calif. Press 2000) (1985).
21. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part I (§§ 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
22. See generally Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3. (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
23. KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL UNITY (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
24. An Act to Reunite the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, and for the Government of Canada, 3 & 4 Vict. ch. 35, §XII (U.K.).
25. Id. §XLI.
26. For powers of the parliament or federal powers, see Constitution Act, 1867, §91 (Can.);
27. for exclusive areas of provincial jurisdiction, see Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 92-93 (Can.).
28. Constitution Act, 1867, §37 (Can.).
29. Members of the Senate are appointed by the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister; id. §24.
30. Id. §§ 36 (Senate) & 49 (House of Commons).
31. For the power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland, see the section of the Good Friday Agreement that establishes a North/South Ministerial Council including those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government: THE AGREEMENT: AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS, N. IRELAND - BRITAIN, Apr. 10, 1998, available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf;
32. the power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is set forth in THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS ON BOSNIA (1995), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html. The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two federal units, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, respectively: however, the former is divided into Croat- and Bosniak-controlled cantons.
33. Seats on Canada's Supreme Court are allocated on a regional basis. Currently, three judges come from Ontario, one from the Maritime provinces, two from the Western provinces, and three from Quebec. This allotment of seats is merely a practice or tradition that became a convention (with the exception of Quebec; see infra note 32);
34. see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, ch. 8.3 (5th ed., Thomson Carswell 2007).
35. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S 26, §§ 4 (198 5) (requiring nine judges) & 6 (requiring three judges from Quebec) (Can.); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, §41(d) (U.K.) (requiring any changes to the composition of the Supreme Court to have unanimous federal and provincial consent).
36. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. ch. 64 (1991) (Can.).
37. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, ch. 16 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1860).
38. Official Languages Act, R.S.C., ch. 31 (4th Supp. 1985) (Can.).
39. Charter, §16.
40. Constitution Act 1867, §133; Charter, §§ 17(1) & 18(1); Official Languages Act, §§ 4-9.
41. Constitution Act, 1867, §133; Charter, §19(1); Official Languages Act, §§ 14-20. Section 133 has been interpreted as giving courts the choice of which language to use in communicating with litigants and in conducting proceedings, not as a language right designed to give choice to the litigants: MacDonald v. City of Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449 (Can.). However, this jurisprudence has been thrown into doubt by R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 (Can.).
42. Charter, §20; Official Languages Act, §§ 21-24.
43. Office of the Commissioner ofOfficial Languages, Making It Real: Promoting Respectful Co-existence of the Two Official Languages at Work (Apr. 2005) (Can.), available at http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/language_work.pdf
44. Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Walking the Talk: Language of Work in the Federal Public Service (Mar. 2004) (Can.), available at http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/docs/e/work-travail-2004-e.pdI
45. Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. ch. C 11 (2007).
46. Id. §§ 10-13; A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (Can.).
47. Id. §§ 14-20.
48. Constitution Act, 1867, §93 (Can.).
49. Charter, §23(1)(b).
50. Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 (Can.).
51. Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201, 2005 SCC 14 (Can.).
52. Charter, §§ 6(2)-(4) & 15.
53. Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
54. KYMLICKA, supra note 3, at 5.
55. Carol S. Leff, Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations, 51 WORLD POL. 205, 210 (1999).
56. Id. at 216.
57. Id.
58. André Liebich, Nations, States, Minorities: Why is Eastern Europe Different? 42 DISSENT 313, 317 (1995).
59. Steven L. Burg, Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart, 92 CURRENT HIST. 357 (1993).
60. MICHAEL KEATING, PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY: STATELESS NATIONS IN A POST-SOVEREIGNTY ERA 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
61. Id. at 6.
62. The same tendencies can be found in the work of other Canadian political theorists. See, e.g., Wayne Norman & Jim Tully, Secession and (Constitutional) Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL PLURALISM 84 (Ferran Requejo ed., Routledge 2001);
63. James Tully, Introduction, in MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES 1 (James Tully & Alain-G. Gagnon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001);
64. Wayne Norman, Justice and Stability in Multination States, in MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES90 (James Tully & Alain-G. Gagnon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
65. KYMLICKA, supra note 3, at 2 7-2 8.
66. Id. at 143.
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Will Kymlicka, Minority Nationalisrn and Multination Federalisrn, in POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR91, 102-110 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
70. Will Kymlicka, Reply and Conclusion, in CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED? WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 345, 389-393 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
71. KYMLICKA, supra note 2, at 3.
72. Kymlicka, supra note 63, at 92.
73. Id. at 96.
74. Kymlicka, supra note 64;
75. ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh & Will Kymlicka eds., Ohio Univ. Press 2004);
76. MULTICULTURALISM IN ASIA (Will Kymlicka & Baogang He eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
77. Kymlicka, supra note 64, at 388.
78. Boagang He & Will Kymlicka, Introduction, in MULTICULTURALISM IN ASIA, supra note 68, at 1.
79. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS: NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF DIVERSITY (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (manuscript on file with the author).
80. Id. at 16-17.
81. See ROBERT YOUNG, THE STRUGGLE FOR QUEBEC: FROM REFERENDUM TO REFERENDUM? (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1999).
82. See, e.g., DAVID J. BERCUSON & BARRY COOPER, DECONFEDERATION: CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC (Key Porter 1991);
83. THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? (R. Kent Weaver ed., Brookings Inst. 1992);
84. CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT: CANADA AFTER THE REFERENDUM OF 1992 (Curtis Cook ed., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1994);
85. ROBERT BOTHWELL, CANADA AND QUEBEC: ONE COUNTRYAND TWO HISTORIES (Univ. Brit. Colum. Press 1995);
86. DAVID M. THOMAS, WHISTLING PAST THE GRAVEYARD: CONSTITUTIONAL ABEYANCES, QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (Oxford Univ. Press 1997 );
87. PAUL ROMNEY, GETTING IT WRONG: HOW CANADIANS FORGOT THEIR PAST AND IMPERILLED CONFEDERATION (Univ. Toronto Press 1999);
88. REED SCOWEN, TIME TO SAY GOODBYE: THE CASE FOR GETTING QUEBEC OUT OF CANADA (McLelland & Stewart 1999).
89. CAN CANADA SURVIVE? UNDER WHAT TERMS AND CONDITIONS? 29 (David M. Hayne ed., Univ. Toronto Press 1997).
90. See also YOUNG, supra note 73;
91. THE REFERENDUM PAPERS: ESSAYS ON SECESSION AND NATIONAL UNITY (David R. Cameron ed., Univ. Toronto Press 1999);
92. TWO NATIONS, ONE MONEY? (David E.W. Laidler & William B.P. Robson eds., C.D. Howe Inst. 1991);
93. CLOSING TIE BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS UP(Paul M. Boothe ed., C.D. Howe Inst. 1991);
94. GORDON RITCHIE ET AL., BROKEN LINKS: TRADE RELATIONS AFTER A QUEBEC SECESSION (C.D. Howe Inst. 1991);
95. NEGOTIATING WITH A SOVEREIGN QUEBEC(Daniel Drache & Roberto Perrin eds., James Lorimer 1992);
96. STANLEY H. HARTT ET AL, TANGLED WEB: LEGAL ASPECTS OF DECONFEDERATION (John McCallum ed., C.D. Howe Inst. 1992);
97. ALAN FREEMAN & PATRICK GRADY, DIVIDING TIE HOUSE: PLANNING FOR A CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC (Harper Collins 1995);
98. TREVOR McALPINE, THE PARTITION PRINCIPLE: REMAPPING QUEBEC AFTER SEPARATION (ECW Press 1996);
99. RICHARD JANDA, DUAL INDEPENDENCE: THE BIRTH OF A NEW CANADA AND THE RE-BIRTH OF LOWER CANADA(Varia Press 1998);
100. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE(Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene & Douglas D. Purvis eds., John Deutsch Inst. Stud. Econ. Pol. 1991);
101. MARCEL CÔT-acE, IF QUEBEC GOES... THE REAL COSTS OF SEPARATION (Stoddart 1995);
102. GORDON GIBSON, PLAN B: THE FUTURE OF THE REST OF CANADA(Fraser Inst. 1994);
103. QUEBEC-CANADA: WHAT IS THE PATH AHEAD? (John E. Trent, Robert Young & Guy Lachapelle eds., Univ. Ottawa Press 1996);
104. This genre of scholarship is not new. For an earlier example, published in the wake of the 1976 election of the Parti Québecois, See MUST CANADA FAIL? (Richard Simeon ed., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1977).
105. The Meech Lake Accord was a package of failed constitutional amendments which included a proposed addition to the Constitution that recognizes Quebec as a "distinct society": 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD (Can.), sched. Constitution Amendment, 1987 (Can.).
106. Act to Establish the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, S.Q. 1990, ch. 34, & subsequent amendments, S.Q. 1990, ch. 45 (Can.).
107. See supranotes 74 & 75.
108. PIERRE E. TRUDEAU, The New Treason of the Intellectuals, in FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS 151 (Macmillan 1968).
109. Id. at 154, 178, 179.
110. CHARLES TAYLOR, Shared and Divergent Values, in RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES 155 (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1993).
111. Id. at 183.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. This is another set of failed constitutional amendments: CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION (CAN.), Pt. 1, §A(1) Canada Clause (1992) (also known as the Charlottetown Accord).
115. Charles Taylor, Deep Diversity and the Future of Canada, in CAN CANADA SURVIVE, supra note 75.
116. Id. at 30.
117. Id.
118. CHARLES F. DORAN, WHY CANADIAN UNITY MATTERS AND WHY AMERICANS CARE: DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AT RISK xiv, xv (Univ. Toronto Press 2001).
119. For Kofi Annan's intervention, see Louise Leduc, Entrevue avec le secrétaire général de l'ONU [Interview with the Secretary General of the UN], LE DEVOIR (Montreal), Oct. 5, 1998, at A4;
120. for Mikhail Gorbachev's intervention, see Miro Cernetig, Stay United, Bush tells Canada, Gorbachev Cites Fractured USSR, GLOBE & MAIL , Oct. 10, 1995, at A1.
121. A ROLE OF PRIDE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD: DEVELOPMENT 12 (Can. Int'lDev. Agency 2005).
122. For an earlier statement of this position, see Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada, Address on the occasion of his visit to Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/ govrel//pdfs/MartinApril29Washington.pdf.
123. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT: A FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA FOR CANADA 8, 10 (Foreign Aff. & Int'l Trade Can. 2006).
124. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD's ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T GO IT ALONE 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
125. JENNIFER WELSH, AT HOME IN TIE WORLD: CANADA'S GLOBAL VISION FOR THE 21st CENTURY 189 (Harper Collins 2004).
126. Philip Resnick, Toward a Multinational Federalism: Asymmetrical and Confederal Alternatives, in SEEKING A NEW CANADIAN PARTNERSHIP: ASYMMETRICAL AND CONFEDERAL OPTIONS 71 (Leslie Seidle ed., Inst. for Res. on Pub. Pol. 1994).
127. Id. at 85.
128. Id.
129. KYMLICKA, supra note 2, at 4.
130. Id. at 5.
131. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 2;
132. KYMLICKA, Supra note 3;
133. KYMLICKA, supra note 14;
134. KYMLICKA, supra note 63;
135. KYMLICKA, supra note 71;
136. TAYLOR, supra note 81;
137. Taylor, supra note 86;
138. ALAN CAIRNS, RECONFIGURATIONS: CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Douglas E. Williams ed., McLelland and Stewart 1995);
139. MCROBERTS, supra note 23.
140. Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Review and the Conditions of Democracy, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 335 (1998).
141. See generally Sujit Choudhry, Referendum? What Referendum?, 15 LIT. REV. CANADA 7(2007);
142. Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman's Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I•CON) (forthcoming 2008);
143. Sujit Choudhry & Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, Frank Iacobucci as Constitution Maker: From the Quebec Veto Reference, to the Meech Lake Accord and the Quebec Secession Reference, 57 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 165 (2007);
144. Sujit Choudhry, Popular Revolution or Popular Constitutionalism? Reflections on the Constitutional Politics of Quebec Secession, in LEGISLATURES AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 480 (Tsvi Kahana & Richard Bauman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006);
145. Sujit Choudhry, Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building: Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 933 (2005).
146. PETER RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (2d ed., Univ. Toronto Press 1993) (1992).
147. Reference re Amendment of Canadian Constitution, [1982] 2.S.C.R. 793.
148. The flip side to this point may be that the constitutional amending rules reflect the substantive view that the federal government is the national government that represents all parts of Canada, including Quebec. In the event of negotiations regarding secession, the mind-set reflected in, and reinforced by, those rules would make it hard for the federal government to see itself as the representative of the rest of Canada in those negotiations. See CAIRNS, supra note 100, at 307, 313.
149. See supra note 102.