Performance-based compensation in member-owned firms: An examination of medical group practices

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 300-327

  Ittner, Christopher D ^a   Larcker, David F ^b   Pizzini, Mina ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Compensation; Health care; Pay for performance; Professional service firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 35548963783     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.05.001     Document Type: Article

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