Missing strategic opportunity in U.S. China policy since 9/11: Grasping tactical success

Asian Survey

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 536-559

  Twomey, Christopher P ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic policy; International institutions; Military policy; Rise of China; U.S. policy

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC PLANNING; ECONOMIC POLICY; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; PROFITABILITY; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 35348957911     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: 1533838X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2007.47.4.536     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2. On the benefits of hegemonic provision of public goods, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
3. Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force," International Organization 55:2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215-50.
4. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), p. iv. These themes are echoed in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, among others.
5. Conceptually, it is useful to separate such enmeshing from the harder form of dissuasion. At times in the QDR, the two are grouped together.
6. On the former, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41:2 (January 1989), pp. 208-24.
7. Data in this section are from Thomas Lum and Dick K. Nanto, China's Trade with the United States and the World (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), RL31403, see especially pp. 6-17;
8. as well as U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, , accessed July 8, 2007.
9. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
10. Furthermore, the United States has no interest in an accelerated rate of reform that might undermine the basic political stability of the Chinese state. Civil war in a nuclear-armed behemoth would have catastrophic costs.
11. On the failures of an earlier, more intense focus on human rights promotion in China by Washington, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
12. U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics.
13. On the merits of this managed float over a sudden shock for transitioning China's currency regime, see Barry Eichengreen and Mariko Hatase, Can a Rapidly Growing Export-Oriented Economy Smoothly Exit an Exchange Rate Peg? Lessons for China from Japan's High-Growth Era (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, 2005), Discussion Paper, no. 2005-E-9.
14. Mark A Spiegel, "A Look at China's New Exchange Rate Regime" (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank, 2005), FRBSF Economic Letter, Pacific Basin Notes, 2005-23.
15. Yoichi Funabashi, Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1989).
16. For useful discussions of these, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, U.S.-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes (Washington, D.C.: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2006), Policy Analyses in International Economics, no. 78.
17. Rather, as with U.S.-Japan relations in the 1980s, the tyranny of domestic fiscal deficits and low savings rates will provide background pressure for current account deficits. Menzie D. Chinn, Getting Serious about the Twin Deficits (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), Council Special Report, 10;
18. Staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "The Global Implications of the U.S. Fiscal Deficit and of China's Growth," in World Economic Outlook: Advancing Structural Reforms (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2004). An assessment of the merits of the Bush administration's tax cuts and spending choices is beyond the scope of this essay.
19. Hufbauer, U.S.-China Trade Disputes, p. 62.
20. E.g., Angola, Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela. See Phillip Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2006), Occasional Paper, no. 4.
21. Hui-Wan Cho, "China-Taiwan Tug of War in the WTO," Asian Survey 45:5 (September/October 2005), p. 751.
22. "Cultural Revolution: Chinese Accounting," Economist, January 11, 2007.
23. See, for instance, Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
24. While this is typically a trend whenever the global talks stall, Washington - particularly Congress - could do more to spur the global talks. On the former point, see Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), chapter 13, "The Political Economy of Regional Integration."
25. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
26. Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," Washington Quarterly 25:4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 7-21.
27. See Robert S. Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," Foreign Affairs 85: (March/April 2006), pp. 141-48.
28. Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2004).
29. Michael S. Chase, "Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospects," Asian Survey 45:3 (May-June 2005), p. 380.
30. Eric J. Labs, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2002), CRS-3312.
31. Aegis ships (Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers) possess an advanced suite of radars, combat systems, and interceptors giving them capabilities to defend large areas from airborne threats. The SM-3 missile is the most successful ballistic missile interceptor the United States possesses and is just entering service. Together, these systems give the Navy a robust and validated theater missile defense capability.
32. Formally, the document is known as U.S. Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, D.C., 2004).
33. Indeed, China was singled out by name in that document, questioning its future motives.
34. These intelligence platforms will give the United States high-resolution data regarding adversaries in general, and the latter system was originally designed to focus on ballistic missiles in particular. While these systems would not be held at risk by Beijing's recently tested anti-satellite missiles and lasers, it would be shortsighted not to expect future Chinese research in this area.
35. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of Mad? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30:4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44.
36. Further, it is clear that current Secretary Robert Gates will push less on transformation than on maintaining the existing force to support the Iraq War.
37. Evan S. Mederros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," Washington Quarterly 29:1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 145-67.
38. The most comprehensive survey of the concept can be found in Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 3, "General Deterrence." Morgan is pessimistic about its efficacy in general and about the persistent American reliance on it in particular, see pp. 114-15 and 287-89 specifically.
39. Also see Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory."
40. For a rich summary of these, see Shirley Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006), RL32496.
41. In this incident, a Chinese interceptor collided with an American intelligence plane over international waters. The American plane landed safely, although in Chinese territory, where the crew was detained for nearly two weeks. The pilot of the Chinese plane perished in the incident.
42. Christopher P. Twomey, "Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of Proliferation and Instability," Journal of Contemporary China, forthcoming (2007).
43. Ibid., p. 23 ff. PSI aims to increase coordination among participants regarding monitoring and interception proliferation related shipments at sea. It eschews formal organization and instead is an example of the administration's preference for informal, ad hoc "coalitions of the willing."
44. Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Goods and Technologies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005), MG-353.
45. Denny Roy, Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2006).
46. Indeed, it is striking that critiques of Chinese motives here are quite similar to those levied against the United States's own interaction with the periphery in the Cold War, where the nature of the regime's domestic record was relegated to a secondary position behind strategic expediency.
47. For a supportive description of Beijing's evolution on core sovereignty issues within the UN, see Allen Carlson, "Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention," Pacific Affairs 77:1 (Spring 2004), pp. 9-27.
48. E.g., the departure of Deputy Secretary Zoellick or the EP-3 incident.
49. This has everbeen true. James Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971 , pp. 373-405.
50. Deterrence-by-denial reduces the ability of an adversary to achieve its aggressive goals by militarily preventing success. In contrast, deterrence-by-punishment threatens to impose costs on the adversary for aggressive policy.
51. See Christopher P. Twomey, ed., Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues, under review at Palgrave/MacMillan Press, 2007, ch. 1-3.
52. Paul J. Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: Harper Collins, 1999)
53. Twomey, Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues, ch. 3.
54. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking, 1989), p. 317.
55. An excellent source making that point can be found in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Philip Dore, National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
56. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
57. Britain is the clearest example here.
58. Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Invites Kremlin to Link Missile Systems," New York Times, April 21, 2007.