Defense reform in Taiwan: Problems and prospects

Asian Survey

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 362-382

  Chase, Michael S ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEFENSE INDUSTRY; IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS; POLITICAL REFORM; REFORM PROCESS;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; FAR EAST; TAIWAN; WORLD;

EID: 24144485501     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2005.45.3.362     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. For recent assessments of Chinese military modernization and its implications for Taiwan, see U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, July 2003);
2. and Harold Brown, Joseph W. Prueher, and Adam Segal, eds., Chinese Military Power (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2003).
3. ROC government, MND, Defense Report of the Republic of China, 2002, , accessed December 16, 2003. The report states that China's military modernization has enhanced the capabilities of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF), improved the PLA's force projection capabilities, and increased the quantity and quality of ballistic missiles that could strike Taiwan. The report estimates that by 2005 the PLA will deploy some 600 missiles capable of hitting targets on the island. The report also echoes the U.S. assessment that Chinese military modernization is focused squarely on developing credible military options to threaten or actually use force in a Taiwan scenario, and to prevent or delay U.S. intervention in any conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
4. Military analysts traditionally focused primarily on the quantity and quality of military hardware, but more recent analysis suggests that force employment - the doctrine, tactics, and training that shape how that hardware is actually used on the battlefield - is the most important determinant of success or failure in modern war. See Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
5. Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 2001).
6. See ROC government, MND, Defense Report of the Republic of China, 2000 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2000).
7. Swaine and Mulvenon, Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies, pp. 171-72.
8. Chen Shui-bian, Xin Shiji Xin Chulu: Chen Shui-bian Guojia Lantu - Diyice: Guojia Anquan [New century, new future: Chen Shui-bian's blueprint for the nation - volume 1: National security] (Taipei: Chen Shui-bian Presidential Campaign Headquarters, 1999), pp. 50-51.
9. Su Tzu-yun, "The Evolution of Taiwan's Defense Strategy and Defense Concept of Taiwan's New Administration," Taiwan Defense Affairs 1: 1 (in Chinese and English) (October 2000), pp. 124-25.
10. For more on the domestic debate over the "decisive battle offshore" strategy, see Brian Hsu, "Defense Strategy Debated," Taipei Times, July 14, 2000.
11. For the views of one opponent of the strategy, see Chung Chien, "Offshore Tactics Are Out of Bounds," ibid., July 22, 2000.
12. Even those senior military officers and civilian policymakers who support the new strategy and the corresponding shift in emphasis from "resolute defense" to "effective deterrence" acknowledge that the island's armed forces currently lack the capabilities necessary to support the "decisive offshore battle" concept. Major General Chen Shih-yu, assistant deputy chief of the general staff for operations, described the "decisive offshore battle" strategy as a "goal which we hope to achieve in the future." See Brian Hsu, "Chen's Defense Strategy Wins Approval from Armed Forces," ibid., June 28, 2000.
13. Interviews with civilian defense policy analysts and retired ROC military officers, Taipei, April 2002.
14. Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Has Ambitious Plans," Jane's Missiles and Rockets (online) , April 1, 2004. According to the report, the medium-range surface-to-surface missiles will range 2,000 kilometers; the short-range missiles, 1,000 kilometers; and the land-attack cruise missiles, 1,500 kilometers.
15. Philip P. Pan and David E. Hoffman, "Taiwan's President Maintains Hard Line: Chen Rebukes China in Interview," Washington Post, March 29, 2004.
16. Arthur S. Ding, "The Meanings and Future Prospects to Implement the Two Defense Laws," Taiwan Defense Affairs 2:3 (Spring 2002), pp. 9-10.
17. See MND, Defense Report of the Republic of China, 2002, , accessed December 16, 2003.
18. The political neutrality of the ROC armed forces is codified in Article 6 of the National Defense Law, which states, "The ROC Armed Forces shall remain legally neutral from personal, regional, or party affiliations." See ROC government, Guofang Fa [National defense law], January 29, 2000, p. 1.
19. Ding, "The Meanings and Future Prospects," p. 12.
20. Ching-Jyuhn Luor, Huei-Huang Wang, and Jun-Hsiu Yeh, "Reinventing National Defense Organization in Taiwan," Taiwan Defense Affairs 2:1 (Fall 2001), p. 142.
21. ROC government, MND, Zhanlue Guihua Si [Strategic Planning Department], , accessed August 22, 2003.
22. ROC government, MND, Zhenghe Pinggu Shi Zixungang [Outline of the Integrated Assessment Office], , accessed August 22, 2003.
23. Chen Chao-min, vice minister of armament and acquisition, MND, ROC, "Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference," San Antonio, Texas, February 13, 2003.
24. Luor, Wang, and Yeh, "Reinventing National Defense Organization in Taiwan," p. 150,
25. Interviews with civilian defense policy analysts, Taipei, October 2002.
26. "Troop Numbers to Be Trimmed Back," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 2, 2003.
27. U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1999), p. 3.
28. Li and He et al., Taiwan Bingli Guimo Yanjiu Baogao. The military reportedly has reservations about the DPP legislators' policy recommendations.
29. Yu Sen-lun, "Draft Dodgers," Taipei Times, October 22, 2000.
30. See, for example, Brian Hsu, "Air Force Plans Reforms to Tackle Pilot Shortage," ibid., January 31, 2001. According to this report, the Taiwan Air Force planned to address the problem by broadening recruitment efforts and extending the minimum service commitment for pilots from eight to 14 years.
31. Members of the Legislative Yuan have proposed raising the proportion of volunteers in the armed forces and decreasing the period of compulsory military service from the current 22 months, which many observers believe is already too short to allow new conscripts to master required skills, to perhaps as little as nine months. The air force and navy in particular face concerns that the mandatory service system does not provide sufficient time for recruits to master technologically demandmg responsibilities.
32. "Volunteer Military Will Replace Mandatory System, Yu Reports," Central News Agency (Taipei), October 7, 2003.
33. "Interview: Chen Shui-bian," BBC News, March 30, 2004, .
34. Mure Dickie, "Taipei Tests Alternatives to Military Conscription," Financial Times, May 3, 2002.
35. Interview with ROC government official, Taipei, April 2002.
36. Li and He et al., Taiwan Bingli Guimo Yanjiu Baogao, p. 30.
37. See, for example, Chen, "Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference," in which Vice Minister Chen indicates that streamlining the armed forces is intended to reduce personnel costs, allowing the Taiwan MND "to devote increasingly larger portions" of the island's defense budget "to upgrading and/or introducing new equipment."
38. Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan Arms Package Faces Further Delays," Financial Times, April 30, 2003.
39. Ko Shu-ling, "Pan-Blues Block Special Arms Budget," Taipei Times, March 30, 2005.
40. See MND, Defense Report of the Republic of China, 2002, , accessed December 16, 2003.
41. Shelley Rigger, "Taiwan in 2002: Another Year of Political Droughts and Typhoons," Asian Survey 43:1 (January/February 2003), pp. 41-45.
42. Interview with U.S. business community representative, Washington, D.C., April 2002.
43. Michael D. Swaine, Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy and Weapons Procurement Processes (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1999), p. 46.
44. Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Looks for Cheaper Aircraft Deal with U.S.," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 21, 2003.
45. Interviews with U.S. defense industry analysts, Washington, D.C., May 2003.
46. Richard Lawless, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs, "Remarks to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference," San Antonio, Texas, February 13, 2003.
47. See Mu-Yung Liang, "To Implement the Policy of 'Building Our Warships Domestically' and Flourish the National Defense Industry," Taiwan Defense Affairs 2:1 (Fall 2001), pp. 156-61.
48. On the process of establishing civilian supremacy over the military, see M. Taylor Fravel, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization," Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (Fall 2002), pp. 57-84.
49. See U.S. Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 13-14. According to the report, Taiwan's military is conservative and resistant to change, especially at higher levels. This rigidity has left the military "hampered by systemic problems of poor, antiquated management and a traditional military culture with very rigid command structures, which discourages lower-level risk-taking, decisionmaking, and innovation."
50. Luor, Wang, and Yeh, "Reinventing National Defense Organization in Taiwan," p. 153.
51. See "Failed Coup Still a Coup, Declares Chen," Taiwan News, November 17, 2004. President Chen alleged that "the pan-blue camp and some retired generals still under the influence of the myth that the national army is the KMT party army attempted to use past ties between commanding and subordinate officers to lobby serving generals to enter hospitals and resign to shake military morale."
52. DPP, National Defense Policy White Paper (Taipei, Taiwan: DPP, November 1999). The White Paper called for a series of changes, including strengthening the role of the National Security Council in policy formulation and coordination; institutionalizing legislative oversight in the areas of defense and intelligence; improving benefits for military personnel to bolster morale; enhancing jointness among the services; developing precision strike capabilities; upgrading early warning and C4ISR, including development and deployment of long-range early warning radar, UAVs [unmanned air vehicles], and reconnaissance satellites; increasing active and passive missile defense capabilities; reorganizing the force structure reducing the total number of military personnel; enhancing organizational and procedural efficiency; strengthening Taiwan's defense industries; placing greater emphasis on training and exercises; improving logistics and sustainment capabilities; and developing a doctrine that emphasizes flexibility, mobility, and readiness.
53. See Allan R. Millett, "Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 329-68.
54. See, for example, Peter W. Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, "The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years," testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2004. Referring to Taiwan's modest level of defense spending, Rodman stated, "We have made clear to our friends on Taiwan that we expect them to reverse this defense budget decline. Though our commitments to Taiwan are enduring, the American people and both the Executive Branch and Congress expect the people of Taiwan to make their own appropriate commitment to their freedom and security."
55. "Chen Admits to Weapon-Sale Frictions," Taipei Times, February 26, 2003.
56. Brian Hsu, "Defense Minister Takes Offense at Reports from U.S.," ibid., August 30, 2002.