Selfish unsplittable flows

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3142, Issue , 2004, Pages 593-605

  Fotakis, Dimitris ^a,b   Kontogiannis, Spyros ^a,c   Spirakis, Paul ^a  

^a University of Patras and Computer Technology Institute   (Greece)

^b ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF THESSALONIKI   (Greece)

^c UNIVERSITY OF IOANNINA   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

CONGESTION GAMES; EXACT POTENTIAL GAME; GENERAL NETWORKS; NETWORK CONGESTION GAME; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; UNSPLITTABLE FLOW;

NETWORK LAYERS;

EID: 35048860465     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_51     Document Type: Article

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