Strategic consequences of historical cost and fair value measurements

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 557-584

  Reis, Ricardo F ^a   Stocken, Phillip C ^b  

^a CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PORTUGAL   (Portugal)

^b DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Edgeworth Bertrand game; Endogenous expectations; Fair value; Historical cost

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547775735     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/0274-9457-GP27-5215     Document Type: Article

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