Moral responsibility, love, and authenticity

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 106-126

  Haji, Ishtiyaque ^a   Cuypers, Stefaan E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547704996     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2005.00261.x     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. A notable exception is Derk Pereboom. See his Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2. See John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.
3. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 79-101.
4. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), 6, 174-196.
5. For this distinction, see also J. L. Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 106-7.
6. On varieties of normative responsibility, see Ishtiyaque Haji, Moral Appraisability. Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 177-96.
7. Michael Slote in "Admirable Immorality", in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 86
8. David Archard, "Children", in The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette (New York: Oxford University Press), 92.
9. Archard, "Children", 92.
10. On relevant progressivist literature, see John Darling and Sven Erik Nordenbo, "Progressivism", in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, ed. Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 288-308.
11. Gareth Matthews in his The Philosophy of Childhood (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) has argued for the contribution to philosophy that children can make.
12. Gareth Matthews, "Socrates's Children", in The Philosopher's Child: Critical Essays in the Western Tradition, ed. S. M. Turner and G. B. Matthews (Rochester, MN: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 21.
13. see, especially, Jean Piaget, Psychology and Epistemology. Introduction, Translation and Notes by P. Wells (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970/1972)
14. and Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 2: The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
15. Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 65.
16. For a critical assessment of this argument, see our "Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation", Dialectica 55(2001):221-38.
17. See our "Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered", International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12(2004):437-62.
18. See, for example, Ishtiyaque Haji, "The Emotional Deparvity of Psychopaths and Culpability", Legal Theory 9(2003):63-82.
19. For concerns about this internalist (non-historical) suggestion, see Stefaan E. Cuypers, "The Trouble with Harry: Compatibilist Free Will Internalism and Manipulation", Journal of Philosophical Research 29(2004):235-54.
20. For elaboration of this connection between moral agency and the moral reactive attitudes, see Peter Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment", Proceedings of the British Academy 48(1962):1-25.
21. Reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 59-80.
22. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 34-35.
23. See, also, Feinberg's "The Child's Right to an Open Future", in Whose Child? Children's Rights, Parental Authority and State Power, ed. W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), 148-51.
24. See Strawson's Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 293.
25. For a similar view, see Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 208.
26. Here, we have drawn from Haji, Moral Appraisability, 126-32.
27. Michael Slote, "Admirable Immorality", 78.
28. See, also, Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. (1976): 115-35;
29. Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1978), 181-8;
30. Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990);
31. and Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints", The Journal of Philosophy 19(1982):419-39.
32. Slote, "Admirable Immorality", 80.
33. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love", in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne, ed. Hans Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 446.
34. Reprinted in Frankfurt's Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 140.
35. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1863/1989), 23.
36. For a recent discussion on acting out of virtue, see Robert Audi, "Acting from Virtue", Mind 104(1995):449-71.
37. For elaboration, see, for example, David Copp, "The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason", in Self-Interest, ed. A. F. Paul, F. D. Miller Jr., and J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
38. On plain "ought", see, for instance, Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986).
39. See Ishtiyaque Haji, Deontic Morality and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 221-44.