The trouble with Harry: Compatibilist free will internalism and manipulation

Journal of Philosophical Research

Volumn 29, Issue , 2004, Pages 235-254

  Cuypers, Stefaan E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746138388     PISSN: 10538364     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jpr_2004_2     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Such an analysis has been defended by, among others, Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
2. Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," The Importance of What We Care About, 171, note 13
3. and for the second, "The Faintest Passion," in his Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 103-105
4. Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents. From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), chaps. 9 and 10
5. Mele, Autonomous Agents, 172-173
6. See, for example, Gary Watson, "Free Action and Free Will," Mind, 96 (1987): 148, 151
7. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64-65
8. John Christman, "Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (1987): 291
9. See my article, "Autonomy beyond Voluntarism: In Defense of Hierarchy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 225-256
10. Frankfurt, "Three Concepts of Free Action," in his The Importance of What We Care About, 54
11. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," 25
12. This difficulty with the effectiveness of self-identification parallels in some respects the difficulty with the efficacy of mental causation in nonreductive materialism, as thoroughly discussed by Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind, Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), part II
13. Oshana, "Autonomy Naturalized," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 77
14. Frankfurt, "Three Concepts of Free Action," 52
15. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," 16
16. For a further analysis of this latter case, see Watson, "Free Action and Free Will," 151-153
17. Frankfurt, "Three Concepts of Free Action," 53
18. For a similar worry about the fact that Frankfurt's thinking is frequently on the verge of transgressing the boundaries of compatibilism and naturalism, see J. David Velleman, "What Happens When Someone Acts?" Mind, 101 (1992), 461-481
19. Frankfurt, "Three Concepts of Free Action," 54