Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a cournot-stackelberg experiment

Economics Bulletin

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2002, Pages

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Wallace, Brian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547690784     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15452921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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9. Oechssler, J. (2001): Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
10. Selten, R. (1967): Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschr̈ankt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments, in: Beitr̈age zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, H. Sauermann, ed., 136-168.