Equilibrium social insurance with policy-motivated parties

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 624-640

  De Donder, Philippe ^a   Hindriks, Jean ^b  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Electoral competition; Endogenous parties; Social insurance; Wittman equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547662105     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.02.002     Document Type: Article

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