Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 727-745

  Petretto, Alessandro ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Ex post moral hazard; Risks sharing and optimal redistribution; Social insurance

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; MODEL; MORALITY; RISK; SOCIAL INSURANCE;

HEALTH EXPENDITURES; HUMANS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MODELS, ECONOMIC; SOCIAL SECURITY;

EID: 0032758103     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00017-X     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Atkinson, A.B., Stiglitz, J.E., 1980. Lectures on Public Economics. MacGraw Hill, New York.
2. Barr, N., 1998. The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
3. Besley T. Optimal reimbursement health insurance and the theory of Ramsey taxation. Journal of Health Economics. 7:1988;321-336.
4. Besley T. Publicly provided disaster insurance for health and the control of moral hazard. Journal of Public Economics. 39:1989;141-156.
5. Besley, T., Gouveia, B., 1994. Alternative systems of health care provision. Economic Policy, October, 203-258.
6. Blomquist S., Christiansen V. Topping-up or opting-out? The optimal design of public provision schemes. International Economic Review. 39:1998;399-411.
7. Blomqvist A. Optimal non-linear health insurance. Journal of Health Economics. 16:1997;303-321.
8. Blomqvist A., Horn H. Public health insurance and optimal income taxation. Journal of Public Economics. 24:1984;353-371.
9. Blomqvist A., Johansson P.-O. Economic efficiency and mixed public/private insurance. Journal of Public Economics. 66:1997;505-516.
10. Boadway R., Marchand M., Sato M. Subsidies versus public provision of private goods as instruments for redistribution. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 3:1998;545-564.
11. Cremer H., Pestieau P. Redistributive taxation and social insurance. International Tax and Public Finance. 3:1996;281-295.
12. Deaton A. Optimally uniform commodity taxes. Economic Letters. 2:1979;357-361.
13. Deaton A. Optimal taxes and the structure of preferences. Econometrica. 49:1981;1245-1260.
14. Jack W., Sheiner L. Welfare-improving health expenditure subsidies. American Economic Review. 87(1):1997;206-221.
15. Ma C.A., McGuire T.G. Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Economic Review. 87(4):1997;685-704.
16. Manning W.G., Marquis M.S. Health insurance: the trade-off between risk pooling and moral hazard. Journal of Health Economics. 15:1996;609-639.
17. Mooney G., Ryan M. Agency in health care: getting beyond first principles. Journal of Health Economics. 44:1993;125-135.
18. Pauly M.V. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: the roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 88:1974;44-62.
19. Rochet J.C. Incentives, redistribution and social insurance. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. 16:1991;143-165.
20. Selden T.M. Should the government provide catastrophic insurance? Journal of Public Economics. 51:1993;241-247.
21. Selden T.M. More on the economic efficiency of mixed public/private insurance. Journal of Public Economics. 66:1997;517-523.
22. Spence M., Zeckauser R. Insurance, information and individual action. American Economic Review. 61:1970;380-387.
23. Van de Ven W.P.M.M. Regulated competition in health care: with or without a global budget? European Economic Review. 39:1995;786-794.
24. Von der Schulenburg, J., 1995. The relationship between basic and complementary health system: theoretical considerations. In: Schneider, M. (Ed.), Complementary Health Schemes in the European Union. Augsburg Basys.
25. Zweifel, P., Breyer, F., 1997. Health Economics. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.