Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 533-541

  Oddie, Graham ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347170822     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/48.4.533     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. A very clear statement of the argument can be found in B. Skyrms, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press [1990]). Also: I. J. Good, 'On the Principle of Total Evidence', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17 [1967], pp. 319-21; Ramsey's Manuscripts 005-20-01, 005-20-03, reprinted in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41 [1990].
2. A very clear statement of the argument can be found in B. Skyrms, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press [1990]). Also: I. J. Good, 'On the Principle of Total Evidence', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17 [1967], pp. 319-21; Ramsey's Manuscripts 005-20-01, 005-20-03, reprinted in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41 [1990].
3. A very clear statement of the argument can be found in B. Skyrms, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press [1990]). Also: I. J. Good, 'On the Principle of Total Evidence', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17 [1967], pp. 319-21; Ramsey's Manuscripts 005-20-01, 005-20-03, reprinted in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41 [1990].
4. D. Miller, Critical Rationalism (Chicago, Open Court [1994], p. 141). Miller has another interesting argument against the Ramsey-Good solution (ibid., p. 141ff.) - that it can lead an agent into a futile sequence of repetitive experiments from which he will never emerge.
5. For an analysis of this argument see Graham Oddie, 'Rescuing Reason', Philosophy, 77 [1996], pp. 445-64.
6. For example, David Miller argues at length that the central defect of Bayesian is that it has lost sight of the fact that truth is the aim of inquiry. What all Bayesians have in common, he claims, is the dictum 'forget about truth and falsity and put your trust only in the evaluation of probabilities . . . Whether a hypothesis is true or false is no longer a matter of concern to a pure Bayesian. Discovery of the truth is no longer the aim of science' (ibid., p. 128).