Discriminatory versus uniform electricity auctions in a duopolistic competition scenario with learning agents

2006 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2006

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 2571-2578

  Cincotti, Silvano ^a,b   Guerci, Eric ^b   Ivaldi, Stefano ^b   Raberto, Marco ^b  

^a IEEE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEARNING AGENTS; MARKET EFFICIENCY; MARKET POWER;

CHARACTERIZATION; COMPETITION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRICITY; GAME THEORY; LEARNING ALGORITHMS;

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

EID: 34547293297     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

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