Subversion and countersubversion in the campaign against terrorism in Europe

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 30, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 647-666

  Kilcullen, David J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34447571758     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100701435746     Document Type: Article

References (124)

1. "Sir Michael Howard: Mistake to Declare this a 'War,'" quoted in Pravda, 31 October 2001.
2. See (http://english.pravda.ru/main/2001/11/01/19888.html), accessed June 2006.
3. Peter R. Neumann, "Europe's Jihadist Dilemma," Survival 48(2) (Summer 2006), p. 78.
4. House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (London: The Stationery Office, May 2006).
5. United States Government, The 9-11 Commission Report (Washington D. C., 2004), p. 160 ff.
6. Bruce Hoffman, Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground - The Terrorist Threat and the Counter-Terrorism Effort, RAND Testimony Series CT-263 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 2006), p. 8.
7. Adam Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective," Survival 47(2) (Summer 2005), p. 101.
8. David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," The Journal of Strategic Studies 28(4) (August 2005), pp. 597-617.
9. The term "political warfare" is used here in the Bolshevik sense of "political combat" (political activism that countenances the potential use of illegal or violent measures to disrupt an opponent) rather than in the British Commonwealth doctrinal sense (of propaganda, Special Political Action, and Covert Influence).
10. For two excellent analyses of the hybrid character of contemporary threats, from two significantly different points of view, see Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004)
11. and Frank Hoffman "Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs," Orbis 50(3), pp. 395-411.
12. Robert Kaplan, "The Tribal Way of War," The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2006, at (http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/ ?id=110008674), accessed July 2006.
13. Jytte Klausen, "Counterterrorism and the Integration of Islam in Europe," Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 7(7) (July 2006), at (http://www.fpri.org/ww/0707.200607.klausen. integrationislameurope.html), accessed July 2006.
14. Klausen, op. cit.
15. In this article, the term "extremist" is solely used to denote someone who adopts an extreme political (rather than theological) position. Other terms are employed to describe a range of theological positions, which may or may not cluster with extreme political views.
16. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 33-36.
17. See the website (http://www.islamicawakening.com/) as an example of this viewpoint.
18. Jösrgen Nielsen, Director, Danish Institute, Damascus, pers. comm., July 2006.
19. Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" Survival 48(1) (Spring 2006), pp. 81-92.
20. See Nicolas de Boisgrollier, "The European Disunion," Survival 47(3) (Autumn 2005), pp. 55-62.
21. For an analysis that extends this argument to the whole of the post-1945 international order, see Kishore Mahbubani, "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System," Survival 47(4) (Winter 2005-06), pp. 7-18.
22. See David Kilcullen, "The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New South Wales, 2000, for a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to the political anthropology of insurgency in European, Asian and African countries.
23. Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation Washington director, pers. comm., July 2006.
24. David J. Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," Survival 48(4) (December 2006), pp. 111-130.
25. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism - 2005, chapter 2, see (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64332.htm), accessed June 2006.
26. Ibid.
27. See William Rosenau, Subversion and Insurgency, unpublished draft RAND Corporation analysis paper, 7 June 2006.
28. Joel Kotek, "Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 18(2) (June 2003), pp. 168-191.
29. See Neumann, op. cit., pp. 76-78 for details of insurgent support networks identified in Europe.
30. For a detailed discussion ofAl Qaeda-linked foreign fighter networks and their regenerative capability, see Andrew Phillips, "Subverting the Anarchic Society - Religious Radicalism, Transnational Insurgency, and the Transformation of International Orders," paper presented at the Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies, University of Melbourne, 5-7 July 2006.
31. See Country Reports on Terrorism - 2005, ch. 3, at (http://www.state.gov/ s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64333.htm), accessed June 2006.
32. Professor François Burgat, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, pers. comm., July 2006.
33. Strictly speaking, because Sunni Islam lacks a clergy and a universally acknowledged religious hierarchy, there is no such thing as "orthodox" Sunni Islam. The term is used in this case to distinguish religious conservatives from political conservatives. The term is used here to identify traditional religious beliefs that are often permeated by culturally based practices from a person's community of origin. These beliefs are not theologically "fundamentalist" in that they include a significant component of culturally-based practice, which fundamentalists typically seek to eliminate. But they may be highly activist, violent or militant - as in the case of Pashtun-influenced Taliban in Afghanistan, or xenophobic traditionalist Dar'ul Islam insurgents in Indonesia.
34. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006), pp. 207-239, at pp. 207-208.
35. Kilcullen, "Political Consequences," ch. 5.
36. International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," Asia Report No. 83, 13 September 2004, at (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2967&l=1), accessed July 2006.
37. International Crisis Group, "Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?" Middle East Report No. 31, 21 September 2004, at (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id= 3021&l=1), accessed July 2006.
38. Françcois Burgat, The Islamic Movement in North Africa, Trans. William Dowell, Middle East Monograph Series (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas Press, 1997).
39. Confidential source, Baghdad, February 2006.
40. Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst, Annual Report 2003, Den Haag, 2003 (www.aivd.nl).
41. Wiktorowicz, op. cit., p. 208.
42. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), passim.
43. Fernando Reinares, Professor and Chair of Political Science, King Juan Carlos University, Madrid, pers. comm., July 2006.
44. See Article 1(2) of United Kingdom, Security Service Act, 1989, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, available at (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1989/Ukpga_19890005_en_2.htm#mdiv1).
45. See M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940) for a series of studies of this phenomenon, among others, in the context of de-tribalisation in Africa.
46. Kilcullen, "Political Consequences," ch. 1, ch 5.
47. See M. Gluckman and E. Colson, Seven Tribes of British Central Africa (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959)
48. and Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970).
49. See Karl D. Jackson, "Urbanization and the Rise of Patron-Client Relations" in K. D. Jackson and L. Pye, eds., Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), passim
50. and Karl Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behaviour (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
51. See also Kilcullen, "Political Consequences," chs. 2 and 4.
52. See Roy, op. cit., passim but particularly chs. 1 and 2.
53. For references to the use of European bases in the preparation of the 9/ 11 attacks see Sageman, op. cit.
54. Neumann, op. cit., p. 74.
55. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism - 2005, chapter 2, see (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64332.htm), accessed June 2006.
56. For a discussion of London's role as a center for asylum for political refugees, see Melanie Philips, Londonistan (London: Encounter Books, 2006), passim. Philips's characterization of the environment in London's Muslim community must be regarded with a high degree of caution; nevertheless the facts she cites have not been substantially disputed - although their interpretation has been questioned.
57. Sageman, op. cit.
58. "Mutual Incomprehension, Mutual Outrage," The Economist, 9 February 2006, at (http://www.economist.com/world/ displaystory.cfm?story_id=5494646), accessed July 2006.
59. Neumann, op. cit., p. 71.
60. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," loc. cit.
61. See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism - 2005, chapter 3, "Terrorist Safe Havens" at (http://www.state.gov/s/ ct/rls/crt/2005/64333.htm), accessed July 2006.
62. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 2.
63. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 15.
64. Quoted in Rosenau, op. cit., p. 1.
65. Kilcullen, op. cit.
66. Rosenau, op. cit., p. 8.
67. See Article 1(2) of United Kingdom, Security Service Act, 1989, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, available at (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1989/Ukpga_19890005_en_2.htm#mdiv1)
68. United States Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Glossary.
69. Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1952), p. 2
70. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-104, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1966, pp. 28-29.
71. United States Department of Defense, ibid.
72. Richard Bach Jensen, "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe," Terrorism and Political Violence 16(1) (Spring 2004), pp. 116-153.
73. For examples of this phenomenon in American and British Intelligence, seeDavid Martin's study of CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton (David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors [New York: Ballantine Books, 1981])
74. and Peter Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Office (New York: Viking, 1987), which - albeit unwittingly - portrays in detail the extremely damaging effects on MI5 of Wright's counterpenetration operation against then MI5 director Sir Roger Hollis.
75. See David Kilcullen, "Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics," Small Wars and Insurgencies 17(1) (March 2006), pp. 44-64.
76. Bradley Bamford, "The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland," Intelligence and National Security 20 (4) (December 2005), p. 600.
77. Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998) (first published 1960), passim but see particularly ch. 1.
78. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, available at (http://www. marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/ minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm), accessed July 2006.
79. See the 1970 manifesto, Build Up the Red Army! at (http://home.att.net/~rw.rynerson/rafgrund.htm), accessed July 2006.
80. Justus Reid Weiner, "The Use of Palestinian Children in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, available at (http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp441.htm), accessed July 2006.
81. Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May-June 2005), pp. 8-12.
82. David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May-June 2006), pp. 103-109.
83. See Selznick, loc. cit.
84. For more on the operational concept of Leaderless Resistance see Louis Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," at (http://home. ddc.net/ygg/ot/ ot-04.htm), accessed August 2006.
85. Mehmood Naqshbandi, Islam and Muslims in Britain (City of London Police, New Scotland Yard, 2006), p. 28
86. Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, Processes d'Enrolement des Jeunes Musulmans dans le Jihad (Paris: DST, 2003).
87. Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst, Recruitment for the jihad in the Netherlands: From Incident to Trend (Den Haag: AIVD, 2002).
88. Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, January 2005
89. House of Commons, op. cit.
90. BBC, "Video of 7 July Bomber Released," 6 July 2006, at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5154714.stm), accessed July 2006.
91. Sheikh Musa Abubakar Admani, London, pers. comm., July 2006.
92. "An Underclass Rebellion," The Economist, 14 November 2005.
93. Ibid.
94. Dr. Garbi Schmidt, National Danish Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, pers. comm., July 2006.
95. In this article, "Islamist" (as distinct from "Islamic") denotes the politicized form of Muslim consciousness that seeks (by legal or other means) to establish shar'ia as the basis for political systems in a country or region.
96. "Mutual Incomprehension, Mutual Outrage," The Economist, 9 February 2006.
97. Pers. comm., confidential source, quoting a British assessment.
98. Roy, op. cit., p. 49.
99. Pers. comm., confidential source, quoting a British assessment.
100. See "Islamist Extremism in Europe," Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs, 5 April 2006.
101. See "PC Sentenced for Leaking Information," at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3713816.stm)
102. and "Translator Jailed for Leaking AIVD Files" at (http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id= 1&story_id=26165&name=Translator%20jailed%20for%20leaking %20AIVD%20files), accessed July 2006.
103. "Al Qaida 'Trying to infiltrate MI5,'" at (http://news.excite.co.uk/uk/9234), accessed July 2006.
104. See Country Reports on Terrorism - 2005, ch. 5 at (http://www.state.gov/ s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64342.htm), accessed July 2006.
105. James Bakker, "Radical Islam in the Netherlands," Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 3(1), 13 January 2005.
106. Roy, op. cit., p. 41 ff.
107. Hizb-ut Tahrir, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 1.
108. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
109. Vladimir Ilich Lenin, "What is to be Done?" (1901) in Lenin Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), volume 5, pp. 347-530.
110. This term, familiar in the context of countering Irish Republican Army terrorism, subversion, and insurgency in Northern Ireland, is also highly applicable to the behavior of key leaders in AQ-linked groups.
111. Lenin, op. cit.
112. See Selznick, loc. cit and U.S. Department of the Army, op. cit. for further details.
113. Detective Inspector R. Lambert, Head, Muslim Contact Unit, London Metropolitan Police, pers. comm., July 2006.
114. Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley, Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, JSOU Report 05-3, Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2005.
115. See particularly Joseph D. Celeski, Operationalizing Counterinsurgency, Joint Special Operations University special report, JSOU, Hurlburt Field, Florida, September 2005, passim.
116. The author is indebted to Mr. Richard Higgins for these categories, which are based on work conducted by Joseph Celeski.
117. Neumann, op. cit., p. 79.
118. See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005), p. 98.
119. See Lawrence Freedman, "The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Countervision," Survvial 47(4) (Winter 2005-06), p. 24 for a description of the process of cultural competition as a factor in the collapse of Communism in Europe.
120. Jensen, loc. cit.
121. Ibid.
122. Theories of terrorist motivation typically incorporate three motivational components: Emotionality, rationality, and ideology. Thus, technically, counterideology work is a subset of countermotivation. But in the context of extremist Islam, it is more appropriate to separate ideology from the other components of motivation because of the highly specialized and often arcane tools, methods, and actors required to counter and replace ideology.
123. The "Foundation" approach to counterinsurgency, developed in Latin America in the 1980s, is a highly successful method that uses the personal networks of government employees, their families and local communities, social and economic networks as a reporting tool and a means of weaning community members away from support for insurgent or terrorist groups.
124. U.S. Institute of Peace, Report on Wilton Park Conference: Towards a Community-Based Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 22 March 2006, (www.usip.org), accessed August 2006.