Corporate governance and firm performance: Some evidence from Chinese listed companies

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 187-201

  Zhao, Ronald ^a  

^a MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

blockholding; China; control; ownership structure; performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447519359     PISSN: 16081625     EISSN: 21642257     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/16081625.2003.10510625     Document Type: Article

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