Market valuation and equity ownership structure: The case of agency conflict regimes

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 249-268

  Pantzalis, Christos ^a   Chansog Francis, K I M ^b   Sungsoo, K I M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency conflict; Market value; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 54649084347     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008381832497     Document Type: Article

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