Five questions: An integrated research agenda for Public Choice

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 1-12

  Munger, Michael C ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034391201     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005048904160     Document Type: Article

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