Timing of environmental inspections: Survival of the compliant

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 17-36

  Rousseau, Sandra ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Environmental regulation; Monitoring and enforcement; Survival analysis; Textile industry

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250902997     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9013-9     Document Type: Article

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