Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-16

  Malik, Arun S ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Enforcement; Environmental regulation; Optimal auditing

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250890768     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9007-7     Document Type: Article

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