Rent seeking and democracy: Empirial evidence for uruguay

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 592-601

  Calderón, César ^a   Chong, Alberto ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250331633     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00023.x     Document Type: Article

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