Erratum to: Inward-looking policies, institutions, autocrats, and economic growth in Latin America: An empirical exploration (Public Choice, (2004), 121, (335-361), 10.1007/s11127-004-1683-1);Inward-looking policies, institutions, autocrats, and economic growth in latin america: An empirical exploration

Public Choice

Volumn 121, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 335-361

  Chong, Alberto ^a   Zanforlin, Luisa ^b  

^a INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 15244362405     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9787-x     Document Type: Erratum

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