A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda's, Copeland's, Slater's and Kemeny's rules

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-16

  Lamboray, Claude ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Comparison of ranking rules; Prudent orders

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250204136     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.04.004     Document Type: Article

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