Leverage, managerial monitoring and firm valuation: A simultaneous equation approach

Research in Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 84-98

  Ghosh, Saibal ^a  

^a RESERVE BANK OF INDIA   (India)

Author keywords

Adjusted Q; India; Leverage; Managerial ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250021957     PISSN: 10909443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2007.03.001     Document Type: Article

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