Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?

Nous

Volumn 34, Issue SUPPL. 14, 2000, Pages 231-248

  Zagzebski, Linda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547768616     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.12     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 (December 1969), pp. 828-839
2. Moral Responsibility, edited by John Martin Fischer (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 143-152.
3. Responsibility and Control, Journal of Philosophy 89 (January 1982), pp. 24-40.
4. Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1996)
5. David Widerker, "Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Philosophical Review 104 (April 1995), pp. 247-261
6. Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions," Faith and Philosophy 12 (January 1995).
7. Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael D. Beaty (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
8. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," pp. 148-149.
9. Margery Bedford Naylor in "Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Philosophical Studies 46 (1984), pp. 249-258.
10. Michael McKenna, "Alternate Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy," Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 28, #3 (Winter 1997), p. 75.
11. Michael Otsuka, "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame," Ethics 108 (July 1998), pp. 685-701.