Equilibria for networks with malicious users

Mathematical Programming

Volumn 110, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 591-613

  Karakostas, George ^a   Viglas, Anastasios ^b  

^a MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Equilibrium; Malicious user; Saddle point; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CRIME; COSTS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

GENERALIZED MODEL; MALICIOUS USER; SADDLE POINT; SELFISH ROUTING;

NETWORK ROUTING;

EID: 34249860142     PISSN: 00255610     EISSN: 14364646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2     Document Type: Article

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