Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 533-555

  Ball, Richard ^a  

^a HAVERFORD COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033470761     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050159     Document Type: Article

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