Semantics for opaque contexts

Nous

Volumn 32, Issue SUPPL. 12, 1998, Pages 141-166

  Ludwig, Kirk ^a   Ray, Greg ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248752133     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.6     Document Type: Review

References (51)

1. Baldwin, T. 1982. Prior and Davidson on Indirect Speech. Philosophical Studies 42: 255-282.
2. Burge, T. 1986. On Davidson's "Saying That". In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
3. -. 1978. Self-Reference and Translation. In Meaning and Translation. London: Duckworth.
4. Blackburn, Simon. 1975. The Identity of Propositions. In Meaning, Reference and Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Cappelan, H. and Lepore, E. 1997. Varieties of Quotation. Mind 106.
6. Church, A. 1950. On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis 10: 97-9.
7. Davidson, D. 1969. On saying that. In Words and Objections Essays On the Work of W V Quine, ed. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, 158-74. Dordrecht: Reidel.
8. -. 1980. The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press.
9. -. 1984a. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.
10. Davies, M. 1981. Meaning, Quantification, Necessity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
11. Dodd, J. 1996. Countering the Counting Problem: a reply to Holton. Analysis 56: 239-245.
12. Evans, G., and J. McDowell, eds. 1976. Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
13. Evans, Gareth. 1985. Does Tense Logic Rest on a Mistake? In Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
14. Feldman, R. 1977. Belief and Inscriptions. Philosophical Studies 32: 349-353.
15. Frege. G. 1960. Sense and Reference. In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Gallie, R. 1977-78. My Last Utterance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 19-29.
17. Hand, M. 1991. On Saying That Again. Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 349-65.
18. -. 1993. Parataxis and Parentheticals. Linguistics and Philosophy 16: 495-507.
19. Higginbotham, J. 1986. Linguistic Theory and Davidson's Semantic Program. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. New York: Blackwell: 29-48.
20. -. 1991. Belief and Logical Form. Mind & Language. 6: 344-369.
21. -. 1995. The Place of Natural Language. In On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Holton, R. 1996. Davidson, McFetridge, and the Counting Problem. Analysis 56: 46-50.
23. Hornsby, J. 1977. Saying Of. Analysis 37: 177-185.
24. Kenney, A. 1963. Oratio Obliqua II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 37: 127-146.
25. Larson, R. and Segal, G. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
26. Lepore, E., ed. 1986. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.
27. Lepore, E. and Loewer B. 1989. You Can Say That Again. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 14: 338-356.
28. -. 1989. What Davidson Should Have Said. In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
29. -. Quine and the Attitudes. In On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Lepore, E. and Ludwig, K. 1998. Truth Conditional Semantics for Tense. Ed. Q. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31. Lepore, E. and Ludwig, K. Manuscript. The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives.
32. Loar, B. 1976. Two Theories of Meaning. In Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33. Lycan, W. 1973. Davidson on Saying That. Analysis 33: 138-139.
34. Ludwig, K. 1996. Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind. Nous 30: 434-460.
35. -. 1997. The Truth about Moods. In Protosociology Cognitive Semantics, I: Conceptions of Meaning. Ed. G. Preyer. Dordretch: Kluwer.
36. McDowell, John. 1976. Quotation and saying that. In Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 206-237.
37. McDowell, J. and Evans, G., eds. 1976. Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
38. Richard, Mark. 1986. Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 9: 383-403.
39. Ross, A. 1988. Davidson on Saying and Asserting. Ratio 1: 75-78.
40. Rumfitt, I. 1993. Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised. Mind vol. 102, no. 407: 429-454.
41. Rumfitt, I. 1996. The vagaries of paraphrase: A reply to Holton on the counting problem. Analysis 56: 246-250.
42. Schiffer, S. 1987a. Extensionalist Semantics and Sententialist Theories of Belief. New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press.
43. -. 1987b. Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge: MIT.
44. Segal, G. and Speas, M. 1986. On Saying That. Mind & Language 1: 124-132.
45. Segal, G. 1989. A Preference for Sense and Reference. The Journal of Philosophy: 73-89.
46. Seymour, M. 1992. A Sentential Theory of Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy: 181- 201.
47. Smith, P. 1976. Blackburn on saying that. Philosophical Studies 30: 423-26.
48. Temin, M. 1975. The relational sense of indirect discourse. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 287-306.
49. Wallace, J. 1972. Belief and Satisfaction. Nous 6: 85-95.
50. -. 1975. On the Frame of Reference. In Semantics of Natural Language. Boston: D. Reidel.
51. Weinstein, Scott. 1974. Truth and Demonstratives. Nous 8: 179-84.