Singular thought and the Cartesian theory of mind

Nous

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 434-460

  Ludwig, Kirk A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042681923     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2216113     Document Type: Article

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