메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 397-407

The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

Author keywords

Correlated equilibrium; Replicator dynamics; Rock Paper Scissors

Indexed keywords


EID: 34248563170     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)

References (18)
  • 1
    • 0002430114 scopus 로고
    • Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
    • Aumann R. Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 67-96
    • (1974) J. Math. Econ. , vol.1 , pp. 67-96
    • Aumann, R.1
  • 3
    • 38149143715 scopus 로고
    • Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
    • Cripps M. Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability. J. Econ. Theory 55 (1991) 428-434
    • (1991) J. Econ. Theory , vol.55 , pp. 428-434
    • Cripps, M.1
  • 4
    • 0001279431 scopus 로고
    • On the evolution of optimizing behavior
    • Dekel E., and Scotchmer S. On the evolution of optimizing behavior. J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992) 392-406
    • (1992) J. Econ. Theory , vol.57 , pp. 392-406
    • Dekel, E.1    Scotchmer, S.2
  • 5
    • 27844461086 scopus 로고
    • Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equation
    • Gaunersdorfer A., and Hofbauer J. Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equation. Games Econ. Behav. 11 (1995) 279-303
    • (1995) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.11 , pp. 279-303
    • Gaunersdorfer, A.1    Hofbauer, J.2
  • 6
    • 27744533227 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Adaptive heuristics
    • Hart S. Adaptive heuristics. Econometrica 73 (2005) 1401-1430
    • (2005) Econometrica , vol.73 , pp. 1401-1430
    • Hart, S.1
  • 7
    • 0013327463 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A general class of adaptive strategies
    • Hart S., and Mas-Colell A. A general class of adaptive strategies. J. Econ. Theory 98 (2001) 26-54
    • (2001) J. Econ. Theory , vol.98 , pp. 26-54
    • Hart, S.1    Mas-Colell, A.2
  • 8
    • 2942744741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium
    • Hart S., and Mas-Colell A. Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium. Amer. Econ. Rev. 93 (2003) 1830-1836
    • (2003) Amer. Econ. Rev. , vol.93 , pp. 1830-1836
    • Hart, S.1    Mas-Colell, A.2
  • 9
    • 0001976283 scopus 로고
    • Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play
    • Hannan J. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. Ann. Math. Stud. 39 (1957) 97-139
    • (1957) Ann. Math. Stud. , vol.39 , pp. 97-139
    • Hannan, J.1
  • 10
    • 34248530472 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Hofbauer, J., 2005. Time-averages of the replicator dynamics and correlated equilibria. Mimeo
  • 12
    • 0030295559 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
    • Hofbauer J., and Weibull J.W. Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies. J. Econ. Theory 71 (1996) 558-573
    • (1996) J. Econ. Theory , vol.71 , pp. 558-573
    • Hofbauer, J.1    Weibull, J.W.2
  • 13
    • 0000093296 scopus 로고
    • Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
    • Moulin H., and Vial J.P. Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. Int. J. Game Theory 7 (1978) 201-221
    • (1978) Int. J. Game Theory , vol.7 , pp. 201-221
    • Moulin, H.1    Vial, J.P.2
  • 14
    • 0017819644 scopus 로고
    • Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics
    • Taylor P.D., and Jonker L. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosciences 40 (1978) 145-156
    • (1978) Math. Biosciences , vol.40 , pp. 145-156
    • Taylor, P.D.1    Jonker, L.2
  • 15
    • 34248523252 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Viossat, Y., 2005. Correlated equilibria, evolutionary games and population dynamics. PhD dissertation. École Polytechnique, Paris
  • 18
    • 0003288597 scopus 로고
    • Population dynamics from game theory
    • Global Theory of Dynamical Systems. Nitecki A., and Robinson C. (Eds), Springer, New York
    • Zeeman E.C. Population dynamics from game theory. In: Nitecki A., and Robinson C. (Eds). Global Theory of Dynamical Systems. Lecture Notes in Math. vol. 819 (1980), Springer, New York 471-497
    • (1980) Lecture Notes in Math. , vol.819 , pp. 471-497
    • Zeeman, E.C.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.