Economic growth and institutions: Some sensitivity analyses, 1961-2000

International Organization

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Durham, J Benson ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248056523     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304583030     Document Type: Review

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