Office Politics (Again)!

Canadian Journal of Law and Society

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 1-26

  Macdonald, Roderick A ^a   Widell, Jonathan ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34247665223     PISSN: 08293201     EISSN: 19110227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jls.2006.0024     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. Happily, those commentators on the paper as delivered read it in the manner it was intended. See Bryan Schwartz, “The inalienable right to be alienated” (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 477, who submitted an unsolicited comment following the conference
2. Lorraine Weinrib, “Why the Dean?” (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 484, and
3. John Whyte, “Normative Order and Legalism” (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 491, both designated commentators.
4. L. Fuller, “Means and Ends” in K. Winston, ed. The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publications, 2002) 61.
5. Of course, just as a focus on means can never obliterate a concern for ends, a focus on ends does not exclude consideration of means. To see an office as an aspiration is also to recognize that in choosing among aspirations were are also choosing the manner in which we deploy the idea of an office to further those ends. For a discussion of this feature of legal institutions in particular see the essays in Part IV of the collection by W. Witteveen & V. van der Burg, eds. Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2000) at 279–408.
6. We explicitly adopt a critical legal pluralist hypothesis about law, and conceive the “legaF’ in that light-see M.-M. Kleinhans & R.A. Macdonald, “What is a critical legal pluralism?” (1996) 12 C.J.L.S. 43
7. R.A. Macdonald, “Kaleidoscopic Federalism” in J.F. Gaudreault-Des Biens & F. Gélinas, eds. The States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and Methodology (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2005) 261; and
8. R.A. Macdonald, “Here, There and Everywhere: Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden; Theorizing Legal Pluralism” in N. Kasirer, ed. Mélanges Jacques Vanderlinden (Montreal: Yvon Blais) [forthcoming in 2006].
9. As for “space” we derive much of our understanding from authors who understand the concept as both physical and social. See, notably, H. Lefebvre, The production of space, trans, by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)
10. Juhani Pallesmaa, The Eyes of the Skin (London: Academy Editions, 1996)
11. M. Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (New York: Routledge, 1993)
12. S.M. Low, et al, eds. The Anthropology of Space and Place (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
13. Obviously, we encounter the problem of everyday vocabulary throughout this essay. It is not just in relation to concepts like “law” and “legal” that our perspective challenges naive realism. See the essays cited The Anthropology of Space and Place 12
14. R.A. Macdonald & D. Sandomierski, “Against Nomopolies” N. Ir. Legal Q. [forthcoming in 2006]. Consider the common expression: “occupy an office.” To say that a professor “occupies an office” is to suggest a physical being in a physical space. Compare, however, the expression that a professor “holds a chair.” In this usage, which equally suggests a physical act in relation to a physical object, we are not trapped into assuming that only a spatial connection is in issue: we also attend to the political relationships that are implied by the concept of a professorial “chair.”
15. For an elaboration of the Cassirer's ideas of presentational and discursive forms, see S.K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) at 79–102.
16. The attribution of meaning is an act of interpretation that implies a conversation in which the reader engages with text, author and object: to interpret and to inhabit an “office” is a political act. Consider in this light, G. Aylesworth, “Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Confronting Gadamer and Ricoeur” in Gadamer and Hermeneutics (New York: Routledge, 1991) 63.
17. The Oxford English Dictionary On-Line, s.v. “office (noun)”, online:
18. These eleven acceptations of office as a noun are reduced in the Webster New Complete Dictionary (New York: Merriam-Webster, 1995) at 363 to four-space, role, service and rite.
19. The thought recalls M. Heidegger, Time and Being, trans, by J. Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York, 1996) at 113: “[t]he true spatial meaning of these expressions [here, over there, there] for Da-sein, however, documents the fact that the theoretically undistorted interpretation of Da-sein sees the latter immediately in its spatial ‘being together with’ the world taken care of, spatial in the sense of de-distancing and directionality.”
20. One of the difficulties of structuralism as a mode of discourse today is the tendency of readers to ascribe to structure either a logical or historical necessity. The more elegant and coherent the structure, the more this false necessity seems incontrovertible. Since part of our objective in this essay is to illustrate the liberating capacity of a structuralism that acknowledges (but does not explicitly argue for) its politics, we have not sought to present a genealogy of offices. See, however, David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) for a reflection on the uncertain connections between site (place) and status (relationship) in all institutional settings.
21. On the power of metaphor see P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), especially at 65–133.
22. See also P. Ricoeur, “Metaphor and symbol” in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976) 52. In the case of offices the migration of the Latin officina into English was complete by the end of the 14th century. Consequently, the understanding of office as the physical place as well as the institution wherein an office was performed or exercised had lost its metaphorical quality by the time of Chaucer and entered the language as a separate usage of the word.
23. Analytical geometry as developed by René Descartes opened the way to expressing points as ordered number pairs in a set of coordinates, and geometrical forms as a set of variables in a set of coordinates. The set of coordinates is built around the idea of axes, where the axes stand for different dimensions. See generally Constance Reid, A Long Way From Euclid (Mineola: Dover, 2004), at 67–77.
24. By adding these dimensions we are ultimately seeking to overcome the limitations imposed by the reduced dimensions of the Euclidian space of our visual-spatial realm. It would be more correct to speak of overcoming the limitations of the Cartesian space by using more dimensions than were introduced by Descartes himself. On this point see H. Lefebvre, A Long Way From Euclid 13 at 284, 293, 312–3.
25. Even if Lefebvre were aware of the significance of dimensions, he failed to see their possibilities for counteracting our everyday concept of space. Consider in this regard, J. Porteous, Landscapes of the Mind: Worlds of Sense and Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
26. To illustrate the pervasiveness of conventionality in frames of reference one need only attend to map-making conventions. Early Christian maps placed Jerusalem in the centre of the world; today we typically place the North Pole at the top of our plane maps or globes; in the United States, the Americas occupy centre stage, while in Europe the zero meridian does so, with the International Date Line displaced to the left and right edges. For discussion, see A. Robinson & B. Petchenik, The Nature of Maps: Essays toward Understanding Maps and Mapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)
27. P. Gould & R. White, Mental Maps, 2d ed. (Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1985).
28. One might have thought, thinking ordinally, that the “zeroth” dimension is beyond the first dimension in one (numerically descending) direction. For the discrepancy between ordinality and cardinality caused by the introduction of zero, see Charles Seife, Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea (New York: Viking Books, 2000), at 59–60.
29. See also Georges Ifrah, The Universal History of Numbers from Prehistory to the Invention of the Computer, trans, by D. Bellos, et al. (London: Harvill Press, 1998) at 510. We begin with the zeroth dimension because it is hard to imagine a “minus-first,” “minus-second,” etc. dimension—although as a matter of mathematical theory, the possibility must exist.
30. The simile is not, of course, exact because of differences between language metaphors and dimensions: metaphors are porous, while dimensions are typically conceived as hard integers; metaphors can produce second generation metaphors, while dimensions are cardinal—although powers (2-squared, 2-cubed) and roots (the square root of 2, the cube root of 2) permit us to imagine second generation dimensions. Regardless, the point is to illustrate that both metaphors and dimensions (especially under fractal theory) have potentially unlimited extensionality. See B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (San Francisco: Freeman, 1983).
31. Perceptual and geometrical spaces are terms used by Henri Poincaré’ in The Foundations of science (New York, The Science Press, 1913) at 66–67, 70.
32. See also Linda Henderson, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidian Geometry in Modern Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) at 36.
33. As such, they can be compared with the taxonomic exercise in, for example, traditional biology. Within the Linnaean taxonomy any given species, may also be described as necessarily a member of a more encompassing genus, family, order, class, and so on. See Carl Linnaeus, Systema naturae, 10th ed. (Stockholm, 1758–1759). This presumptively exhaustive nested classificatory structure nonetheless encounters limiting cases like the duck-billed platypus. Linnaeus himself admitted that the system was artificial. Rather than revise or overthrow the traditional scheme, however, biologists retain it for its pragmatic value, although it is doubtful that many would attach a strong ontological claim to it.
34. It bears notice that “time” is not conceived as a dimension in the matrix. The idea of time as a fourth dimension was first suggested by Hermann Minkowski in a presentation at Cologne in 1908, see A.S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (London: Cambridge University Press, 1928) at 52–53. In fact, time pervades all spatial dimensions- time is the condition by which those who existence is embodied in a particular frame (one dimensional in Lineland, two dimensional as in Flatland, three-dimensional as in Spaceland—the world we know) imagine the relationship of space to movement. That said, we concede that the concept of a dimension is plastic and can mean different things for physicists, mathematicians, theologians, psychiatrists, etc. Indeed, each register could be recast as a dimension—a possibility we suggest in inviting a multidirectional reading of the matrix.
35. The six sections that follow the matrix canvass all six registers. Each of the columns can be seen to reflect one of Lefebvre's understandings of space: spatial-conceived space or representation of space; lexical—perceived space or spatial practice; relational—lived space or representational space; structural—representations of space (the sign); symbolical—the meaning of space (the signified); sensual—the physical marking of space by different sensory indicators. See Lefebvre, The Nature of the Physical World 13 at 38–41, 141, 179, 222, 239, 363.
36. The relationship between sense and space is perhaps the most difficult of those we suggest here. Nonetheless, it has a lengthy pedigree, and many of the associations we make are derived from earlier speculations. For example, over 100 years ago E.A. Abbott assigned different roles to different senses in different dimensions. Abbott argued that two- dimensional Flatlanders would recognize each other primarily by hearing and feeling, not by sight because all forms looked the same in the second dimension (recognition by sight was reserved for those with exceptional mental abilities). See Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland: A Romance with Many Dimensions (London: Seeley & Co. 1884) at 17–27.
37. Euclid, The Thirteen Books of the Elements, trans, by T. Heath, vol. 1 (New York: Dover, 1956) at 153, definition 1. See also definition 16: “And the point is called the centre of the circle,” Flatland: A Romance with Many Dimensions, at 154.
38. The connection of the infinitesimal to the constitution of space is what Lefebvre calls spatial architectonics, see Lefebvre, The Thirteen Books of the Elements 13 at 202–203.
39. See also Witold Rybczynski, The Look of Architecture (New York: New York Public Library, 2001).
40. On invisibility see H.G. Wells, The Invisible Man—A Grotesque Romance (New York: Edward Arnold, 1897). Because an invisible person cannot see himself or herself, an invisible person would have no clue, apart from touching things, where he or she actually was. After a while, an invisible person would lose interest in his or her whereabouts. And as soon as he or she becomes oblivious to his or her precise whereabouts, he or she would obviously lose all sense of space.
41. Compare Mandelbrot's theory of fractals, The Invisible Man—A Grotesque Romance 38. The hierarchy between parts and the whole also collapses when one is construing a text: “ the presupposition of a certain kind of whole is implied in the recognition of the parts”
42. see Paul Ricoeur, “Explanation and understanding” in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, The Invisible Man—A Grotesque Romance 28 at 77.
43. Touch has a direct bearing on the zeroth dimension. Since touch does not operate at a distance, tactile impressions are sufficient for determining the identity of two points. See Henri Poincaré', The Invisible Man—A Grotesque Romance 39 at 259–264.
44. Consider Constance Classen, David Howes & Anthony Synnott, Aroma: The Cultural History of Smell (London: Routledge, 1994) at 103: “ olfactory classification systems do possess a sense, a logic, but that logic is local rather than universal.”
45. F.R. Scott, in The Collected Poems (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981) at 218–19. The challenge is expressed in the exhortation “to strip for more climbing.”
46. The rationale for locating taste in the second dimension is that this dimension evokes the idea of pairs of opposites. “[t]astes are often more complex than smells in that they form pairs of opposites, like sweet and bitter” see Lefebvre, The Collected Poems 13 at 198.
47. This quality of taste defines its other meanings: “[t]astes are the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference.” See P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans, by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) at 56.
48. See also D. Howes, Sensual Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
49. On epistemological problems of visual space, see Steven Feld, “Places sensed, senses placed - towards a sensuous epistemology of environment” in David Howes, ed. Empire of the Senses - The Sensual Culture Reader (Oxford: Berg, 2005).
50. The Beach Boys, Surfer Girl (Capitol Records, 1963).
51. The same feeling is delivered with exquisite poignancy by Lyubov Andreyevna Ranyevskaya in Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard, trans, by Michael Frayn (London: Methuen, 1978) at 43: “I love this house. Without the cherry orchard I can't make sense of my life, and if it really has to be sold, then sell me along with it ”
52. This is to say that absolute space, which we identify with the fourth dimension, makes no distinction between signifler and signified. Hence the individual is not an individual at all in the sense of indivisibility, because the individual consists of an infinite number of selves. See R.A. Macdonald, “Here, There and Everywhere: Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden; Theorizing Legal Pluralism,” Lyubov Andreyevna Ranyevskaya in Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard 13 at 38.
53. Discourse can be regarded as a rite par excellence, because it combines a formal code, or langue, and a concrete event, or parole. See P. Ricoeur, “Language as discourse” in Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning, Lyubov Andreyevna Ranyevskaya in Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard 28 at 6–8.
54. Henri Poincaré’ explained this limitation by the complicity of the retinal sensations, the sensation of convergence and the effort of accommodation by the ciliary's muscle, Lyubov Andreyevna Ranyevskaya in Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard 39 at 204.
55. Arthur S. Eddington submitted that we could see the fourth dimension if our eyes could move with different velocities. Quoted in Richard Panek, The Invisible Century: Einstein, Freud, and the Search for Hidden Universes (New York: Viking, 2004) at 180.
56. Discourse becomes dialogue only in the fourth dimension, or our conception of it, because “ dialogue is an event which connects two events, that of speaking and that of hearing”. See P. Ricoeur, “Metaphor and symbol” in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Lyubov Andreyevna Ranyevskaya in Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard 28 at 16.
57. Hearing belongs in the fourth dimension, as it surpasses the visual realm. W.H. Auden is even more specific, as he situates music, and thus hearing in general, in relation to both the visual and the olfactory realm in his 1948 poem, In Praise of Limestone: “ these Are our Common Prayer, whose greatest comfort is music Which can be made anywhere, is invisible, And does not smell.” See W.H. Auden, Collected Poems, Edward Mendelson, ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1976) at 540–542.
58. On the possibilities of hyperspace see Ian Stewart, Flatterland: Like Flatland, Only More So (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2001) at 281–287.
59. In this regard, Mary Douglas' interactive conception of institutions as the location where life's hard choices are debated and negotiated may be contrasted with the far more pessimistic Foucauldian analysis that now disciplines large sectors of the academy. Compare M. Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) with
60. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans, by A. Sheridan (London: Allen Lane, 1977).
61. The paradox is revealed in the vigour with which professors who have taken retirement struggle to maintain an office somewhere in the University. Without a professorial office, they feel unable to retain the office of professor. For a poignant reflection see F.R. Scott, “On Saying Goodbye to my Room in Chancellor Day Hall”, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 55.
62. Anton Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 66, Leonid Andreyevich Gayev's lines in Act Four, at 59, and in Act One, at 9.
63. For further development of this point, see R.A. Macdonald & J. MacLean, “No Toilets in Park” McGill L.J. [forthcoming in 2005].
64. On such a conception of law and legal space, see R.A. Macdonald, “Here, There and Everywhere: Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden; Theorizing Legal Pluralism”, No Toilets in Park 13,and
65. R.A. Macdonald & D. Sandomierski, “Against Nomopolies”, No Toilets in Park 14.